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Abstract 
This thesis investigates if family businesses meeting two criteria can have better 
performance than non-family businesses. The two criteria are the presence of family 
relationship among board directors and the existence of concentrated ownership 
among family members. The former may have a positive effect on corporate 
performance due to "altruism" among family members, or a negative effect in case of 
jealousy. Then, the existence of substantial family shareholders, may affect corporate 
performance positively due to the convergence of large shareholders' interests, or 
negatively as large shareholders expropriate corporate resources easily. Therefore, 
whether family business performs better than the average firm on balance is very 
much an empirical question. 
According to a previous study, Hong Kong companies on average have more 
concentrated ownership comparing with the firms in other countries and most of the 
concentrated ownership is in the hands of families. Therefore, in order to find out if 
family businesses perform better or not, a cross-section of 62 listed Hong Kong 
companies in 1996 were used in an empirical research. A family business index was 
used in the research to distinguish family businesses meeting the two criteria from 
the other firms. The results of a simple data analysis show that family businesses do 
have better performance on average. However, regression results indicate that the 
positive effect of family businesses on corporate performance is statistically 
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insignificant. 
Besides, the effects of the two criteria on corporate performance were studied 
separately. The results cannot show the presence of family relationship among 
directors having effect on corporate performance. On the contrary, it is more 
plausible that the existence of concentrated ownership can have positive effect on 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
"Family business" is not a new research topic. Many scholars have put much effort to 
analyze and investigate family business. They have given out many notions and 
opinions of family businesses in their books and journals. Scholars do this because 
they also think that family business is special. It is different from just a company and 
yet not fully affected by the norms in a family. If family business is so special, is the 
performance significantly different from a non-family business? Apparently, few 
papers attempt to provide an answer for this question. Therefore, this thesis tries to 
carry out an empirical research to compare the performance of family businesses and 
non-family businesses. 
In the empirical study of this thesis, Hong Kong listed companies are chosen as the 
studying targets. Selecting Hong Kong to be the case study is because people 
generally believe that a certain number of firms in Hong Kong are held and 
controlled by families. In fact, it is not merely a common belief. According to Porta 
et al (1999)，Hong Kong, besides Mexico, has the larger number of family businesses 
among 27 rich economies. Do these family businesses have better performance? Can 
families run companies better? In order to answer this question, Hong Kong 
companies are studied in the present research. 
Before finding out whether family businesses perform better or not, it is necessary to 
define clearly what a family business is. Almost all scholars who study family 
business agree that it is very difficult to have a consensus on the definition of a 
family-owned firm. It is because there are various definitional elements for a family 
business. According to Neubauer and Lank (1998)，these elements include the 
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percentage of shares owned by a family, the number of family members involved in 
management or/and monitoring, the participation of descendents of founder and the 
number of generations of owning family involved in the business, etc. Different 
scholars may employ different elements to define a family business. In this thesis, the 
key definitional elements are the participation of members in management and the 
ownership of a firm by a family. More precisely, a family business is defined as a 
firm in which majority ownership lies within a single family where two or more 
family members are directly involved in the business through having seats on the 
board of the firm. 
Based on the definition, firms should meet two criteria to be family businesses. 
Firstly, some of the directors in a family business must bear a family relationship. 
Secondly, a family business exhibits concentrated family ownership. Accordingly, 
questions asked are “do family businesses meeting these two criteria have different 
performance from non-family businesses?" and "if yes, their performance is better or 
worse? ’， 
The first criterion of family business can possibly affect the corporate performance. 
Some papers, such as Becker (1981), state that altruism exists in a family. That 
means family members are usually willing to consider the other members' benefit 
when they make a decision of their own. This can imply that when a director in a 
family business makes decision about how much effort he should put in monitoring 
the company, he may also consider the benefits of the other directors who are related 
to him. Such consideration will end up with much more effort put by each related 
director who is responsible for monitoring the company. Hence, a family business 
may have a better performance since there are more hard-working directors. 
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However, the positive effect of family relationship among directors dose not 
necessarily exist in family businesses. It is because jealousy is also common among 
family members. They may contend against each other and do something harmful to 
the related directors. How does family relationship affect corporate performance in 
an actual situation? It is an empirical question. 
Simultaneously, the second criterion may also affect the performance of family 
businesses. Actually, the effects of ownership concentration on corporate 
performance have been studied for a certain period of time. According to the 
previous studies, concentrated ownership can produce two opposite effects on the 
amount of effort put by owners who are responsible for controlling a company. One 
of them is that the concentrated ownership may make the owners' wealth more 
dependent on the corporate performance and value, so it can induce owners to put 
more effort in monitoring a firm. Hence, a firm with concentrated ownership should 
have better performance. On the other hand, concentrated ownership gives too much 
power to a small group of owners, so they can have an opportunity to do something 
beneficial to themselves but harmful to the corporate performance, such as 
expropriation; because conflicts may occur between the interests of the family and 
those of the firm as a whole. They have no fear of losing the company if they can 
control a substantial proportion of the shares of their companies. Then, what is the 
effect of concentrated ownership is? This is also an empirical question. 
In brief, this thesis tries to find out if family businesses can perform better than 
non-family businesses. A simple data analysis and simple regression models are 
employed using a cross-sectional data set containing a group of listed Hong Kong 
companies. The results of the simple data analysis suggest that family businesses 
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meeting the two criteria may have better performance on average. However, the 
regression results show that the existence of the better performance is not statistically 
significant. 
In Chapter two, a literature review of family business, altruism among family 
members and ownership concentration is given. In Chapter three, the hypothesis 
about the effects of the two criteria of family businesses ~ family relationship and 
concentrated ownership ~ on corporate performance is explained. In Chapter four, 
the methodology of the research, a simple data analysis and simple regression models 
are introduced. Chapter five introduces the sources of data and explains what firms 
are included in the study. The empirical results are presented in Chapter six. Chapter 
seven contains conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Before presenting the results of this thesis, it is better to have a review of the 
previous literature. The literature review here covers three areas. They are family 
business, altruism in families and ownership concentration. 
Family business is a big topic. It involves many elements scholars would like to pay 
attention to in their studies. For example, evolution of family business, succession 
between two generations, culture inside family businesses, advantages and 
disadvantages possessed by a family business. Many of these studies involve 
sociological and psychological ideas. Although the aspects analyzed and the 
approach of investigation used in their studies are different from those in this thesis, 
a brief literature review about these studies cannot be omitted. It is useful to get a 
general idea about other scholars' notions of family business before developing own 
approach of study. 
The aspect chosen in the present study is the performance of family businesses that is 
supposed to be affected by two criteria met by family businesses. These two criteria 
are the presence of family relationship among directors and the existence of 
concentrated ownership. Accordingly, after the literature review of family business, 
the literature review on altruism among members with family relationship and on 
ownership concentration are given out too. 
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2.1 Literature on Family Business 
Many studies about family business are based on case studies, interviews with 
members in family businesses or questionnaires. After collecting first-hand 
information, scholars summarize and interpret it with their own words and ideas. At 
the same time, some other scholars base on the second-hand information to build up 
their own notions about family-owned firms. No matter using first-hand or 
second-hand information, scholars emphasize different aspects and elements of 
family business in their researches. In fact, no well-developed literature and few, or 
even no, well-built theories about family business can be seen, but only scattered 
ideas from different scholars' works can be found. Some of the ideas are shown 
below. 
Institutional overlapping in family business 
Lansbery (1983) points out that family business actually contains two social 
institutions. One is family; one is business. Each institution defines social relations in 
terms of a unique set of values, norms, and principles. Also, each has its own distinct 
rules of conduct. For family, its social function is to assure the care and nurturance of 
its members, so social relations are structured to satisfy family members' various 
developmental needs. For business, its function is to generate goods and services 
through organized task behavior, so social relations in firms are guided by principles 
that facilitate the productive process. 
Lansberg (1983) also states that in early stage, family firms often benefit from the 
overlap between family and business principles. It is because during these early days 
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the family often provides the firm with a steady supply of trustworthy manpower. 
However, as the business matures, more complex organizational forms emerge, 
• � 
institutional overlap between family and firm begins to generate conflicts in the 
organization. Lansberg (1983) claims that the founder of a family firm experiences 
these institutional contradictions most strongly and these contradictions frequently 
interfere with the effective management of human resources in family firms. 
Appropriate role of family within business 
The question followed is how people choose if they face the contradictions between 
the norms that operates in family and those in firm. Birley et al (1999) involves a 
research which explores the attitudes of owner-managers to the conflicting pressures 
of family and business. In order to do so, a questionnaire was mailed to a random 
sample of owner-managers in the United Kingdom. According to Birley et al (1999), 
the respondents are divided into three groups. The first group involves one third of 
the owner-managers. This paper does not have any particular strong views but is 
concerned to arrive at an appropriate balance between family and business issues. 
For example, it believes that a family business is not automatically defined by the 
acquisition of a family and business affairs should be kept separate from family 
affairs. The second group includes one third of the respondents. This paper expects 
that family should play an important role in running a family firm as it believes that 
the business is stronger with family members involved. For example, it considers that 
children from a family business have a responsibility for the business and shares 
should only be transferred to members of the family. The other one third of 
owner-managers in the last group oppose the views of the second group. Birley et al 
(1999) believes that family should not influence the business. For example, it thinks 
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children should not necessarily receive shares in the business in equal parts and 
family members are not entitled to differential pay arrangements. In sum, 
owner-managers of family business have various attitudes towards the role of family 
in the business. There is no certain attitude prevalent among the owner-managers of 
family business. 
Weaknesses and strengths of family business 
With the special situation, family business has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Many papers try to find them out. Donnelley (1964) is one of them. This paper 
identifies some of the advantages and disadvantages of family-owned firms. Its work 
is based on the observations of 15 successful family companies, supported by 
personal interviews with family managers and other interested businessmen and 
educators. The paper points out six strengths of family business. They are i) the 
availability of otherwise unobtainable financial and management resources because 
of family sacrifices, ii) the important community and business relationships 
stemming from a respected family name, iii) a dedicated and loyal internal 
organization, iv) an interested and unified management-stock-holder group, v) a 
sensitivity to social responsibility and vi) the continuity and integrity in management 
policies and corporate focus. At the same time, the paper also mentions four 
weaknesses of family-owned firms. They are i) conflicts occurring between the 
interests of the family and those of the enterprise as a whole, ii) a lack of discipline 
being exerted over profits and performance in all parts of the organization, iii) a 
failure to rise quickly to meet new marketing challenges and iv) situations where 
nepotism rules unchecked by objective standards of meritorious managerial 
performance. 
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Donnelley (1964)，in the conclusion, points out that a popular belief suggesting when 
family and business are interrelated a less efficient business enterprise generally 
results is unfounded. It thinks people have this belief ignore the fact that effective 
administrative practice is founded on an understanding of all human relationships. 
Governance in family firms 
After perceiving the special situations and weaknesses of family businesses, scholars 
and businessmen want to look for some ways to improve the performance of family 
businesses. Some books giving out the methods to have better governance have been 
published. Usually, writers suggest setting up a board in a family business, where 
outside directors must be involved to be consultants. It is because someone not 
related to the family can give objective opinions to the family business. Also, they 
can help to moderate the conflicts between family interests and corporate interests 
when family members have to make decision for the firm. In addition, scholars 
advise family members to have family meetings frequently besides board meetings 
since some problems can be solved more easily in a causal environment. 
2.2 Literature on Altruism in Families 
Among the strengths of family business, personal sacrifice probably is the most well 
known one. Its existence is usually explained by an idea called altruism. Papers 
studying family commonly states that altruists do exist in families. Becker (1976) is 
one of them. 
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Economic model for explaining altruism 
Becker (1976) remarks that the idea "survival of the fittest" suggested by biologists 
can explain why human beings are egoists and only concern self-interests. However, 
sociologists find that there are really altruistic people in the world. Then a question 
produced is how the altruists survive. Finally, sociologists build models with "group 
selection" to explain this paradox. Thereafter, Becker (1976)，from an economist's 
view, develops an economic model to explain the existence of altruism. 
In its model, there is only one altruist and all the other people are egoists. Note that 
the utility of the altruist depends on others' utilities besides his own one. Also, the 
altruist is willing to reduce his own consumption in order to increase the 
consumption of others, so there is a transfer from his resource to others in his budget 
line. However, one thing Becker (1976) does not mention. That is the reason why 
there is an altruist at the beginning. After enunciating the model, Becker (1976) 
shows two important things. Firstly, even though an altruist gives away part of his 
income and refrains from some actions that raise his own income, his own 
consumption might not be less than that of an egoist because the beneficiaries of his 
altruism would consider the effect of their behavior on his consumption. That means 
the egoists' increasing utilities can benefit the altruist too as his utility depends on 
others'. Secondly, each of the egoists receiving transfer from the altruist has an 
incentive to consider the altruist's utility in his decision making for consumption. 
Then everyone in the group seems to be an altruist even he is not in nature. Becker 
(1976) calls this the "rotten-kid" theorem. 
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The theorem is more clearly explained in a book called "A treatise on the family" 
written by Becker in 1981. Becker (1981) states that sufficient caring by an altruist 
induces even selfish beneficiaries to act as if they care about their benefactor as 
much as they care about themselves. In addition, Becker (1981) states that the caring 
of the altruist and his selfish beneficiaries implies that they are willing to internalize 
all externalities affecting each other, so efficiency can be increased. 
Meanwhile, Becker (1981) claims that altruism is more common within a family. It 
explains that it is not only because altruism is more efficient in small organizations, 
such as a family, but also because family members have many interactions. Both of 
these reasons make altruism more common in a family. 
However, Becker (1981) admits that families with altruistic members are not 
perfectly harmonious. It is because envy and jealousy do exist among family 
members. Usually, children want larger contributions from their parents and wives 
want larger contributions from their husbands. These envious children and wives also 
want smaller contributions to their siblings or co-wives. Without doubt, envy 
produces conflict between enviers and victims. In the model of Becker (1981)，the 
consumption of the victims can be considered as negative inputs into the production 
of a commodity. An envier is willing to reduce his own consumption if this action 
can reduce the consumption of his victims sufficiently. That means he will take all 
actions that can raise the difference between their own incomes and the incomes of 
victims. Finally, Becker (1981) claims that families with both altruistic and envious 
members have neither perfect harmony nor pervasive conflict. 
In fact, part of the hypothesis in this thesis is similar to the idea of Becker (1981). 
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That is altruism in families may increase the efficiency through the action of 
internalization of the externalities; on the contrary, envy may also exist among family 
members to damage the harmony among them. The hypothesis is explained in more 
detail in Chapter three. 
2.3 Literature on Separation of Corporate Ownership from Control 
Besides the presence of family relationship among directors, concentrated ownership 
is another criterion to be met by family businesses. This criterion may affect 
corporate performance too. Before showing how concentrated ownership affects 
corporate performance，it is better to know something about ownership concentration. 
Without doubt, studies of ownership concentration are generated from the idea of 
separating corporate ownership from control. 
First study of separating corporate ownership from control 
Berle and Means (1932) is the founder of the concept of separation of corporate 
ownership from control. This book claims, ” Dispersion in the ownership of separate 
enterprise appears to be inherent in the corporate system. It has already proceeded far, 
it is rapidly increasing，and appears to be an inevitable development." Such 
dispersion in ownership then inevitably brings about a problem that is the separation 
of ownership from control in a firm. Berle and Means (1932) states, "The separation 
of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which 
formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear." Thereafter the phenomenon 
and the problem the book points out lead many flirther studies about the separation of 
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corporate ownership from control. Among these studies, some are theoretical 
researches about the governance problems with the ownership structure after the 
separation; some are empirical researches about the effects of the ownership structure 
on some financial variables after the separation. 
Theoretical research—agency costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentions theory of the firm and tries to use agency costs 
to explain the problem of ownership structure after separating corporate ownership 
from control. It claims that if a firm is not fully owned by a manager-owner, agency 
costs will emerge. In other words, if a firm has many owners and is only managed by 
a small group of managers, agency costs will be generated by the divergence 
between the managers' interests and the small outside owners' interests. It is because 
the managers bear only a fraction of the cost of any benefits they take out from the 
firm to maximize their own utilities, they have incentive to consume the resources of 
the firm instead of maximizing the firm's value. To control their activities, owners 
have to bear high agency costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also points out that the small outside owners may be 
shareholders or bondholders. The agency costs are different between the firms where 
outside owners are shareholders and the firms where outside owners are bondholders. 
That means the agency costs of firms financed by issuing equity are different from 
by using debt. After that, Jensen and Meckling (1976) sets up a model to calculate 
the optimal ratio of equity and debt to minimize the agency costs in a firm. 
What this paper contributes is giving a clearer and more precise explanation for the 
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problem of the ownership structure after separating corporate ownership from control 
in terms of a firm's costs. 
Theoretical research-viability of ownership structure after the separation 
Fama (1980), on the contrary, pays attention to the viability of the separation of 
security ownership and control in corporation. It states that such separation is an 
efficient form of economic organization. That means even the two functions of an 
entrepreneur ~ management and risk bearing are performed separately by different 
agents，the problem of corporate governance caused is not serious. It is because both 
of the managers and risk bearer are disciplined by competition from other firms, 
which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of 
the entire team and of its individual members in a firm. In more precise language, the 
risk bearers, as residual claimants, suffer the most direct consequences from the 
failings of the team. And the managers, like coaches of any team, may not suffer any 
immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current performance of their team, 
but the success and failure of the team impacts their future wages. Hence, they also 
have incentive to do their jobs well in their firm. 
The main concept Fama (1980) introduces is that large corporation with the 
ownership structure characterized by the separation of security ownership and 
control is a viable form of economic organization. However, it is difficult to test his 
concept of the market competition power that can ensure the good behaviors of 
managers and owners in firms. 
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Theoretical research—explanation for survival of ownership structure after the 
separation 
Besides calling attention to the viability of the separation of ownership and control, 
Fama also cooperates with Jensen to publish a paper. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
contends that separation of decision function from controlling a firm and risk bearing 
function from owning a firm survives in organizations because of two reasons. One 
of them is that such organizations get benefits of specialization of management and 
risk bearing. The other reason is that there is a separation of decision management 
from decision control in the organizations. The later reason actually bases on the 
main hypothesis in the paper. Fama and Jensen (1983) states that if an individual 
agent dose not exercise exclusive management (initiation and implementation) and 
control (ratification and monitoring) rights over the same decisions, his power of 
expropriating the interests of residual claimants can be limited. That means the 
agency problem is not so serious as people commonly believe. Therefore, the 
ownership structure due to the separation of ownership and control can still survive 
in large organization. 
Even the agency problem between managers and owners can be really solved by the 
solution mentioned by Fama and Jensen (1983)，there is still a problem existing 
among owners having controlling right over the decisions. The problem is a tendency 
to free ride on others' effort among controlling owners. 
Theoretical research-solution for free-rider problem in controlling the management 
of firms with ownership structure after the separation 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) concentrates on the problem of lack of owners' incentive 
to control the management in firms. That is this paper focuses on the agency problem 
among owners with controlling right rather than between managers and owners. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) claims that there is a free-rider problem in controlling 
management among owners, especially among the small owners since they do not 
have a big enough stake in the firm to absorb the costs of watching the management. 
Without a proper control, the managers can do what they like and ignore the 
shareholders' interests as well as the performance of a firm. To solve this problem, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggests that a firm should have a large shareholder. It is 
because the large shareholder can capture higher return from controlling the 
management to cover his cost, then he has more incentive to control. Meanwhile, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) treats the initiation of takeover of a firm as a controlling 
method used by shareholders. Subsequently, it develops a model showing that when 
the proportion of the firm's shares held by the large shareholder rises, a takeover 
becomes more likely and the price of a firm's shares increases. 
The hypothesis in Shleifer and Vishny (1986) brings about an idea that is a certain 
ownership concentration guaranteeing a better monitoring over the management in a 
corporation where there are many shareholders, thus the corporation with this 
concentrated ownership can have better performance. Its idea then arouses scholars' 
attention to the topic of ownership concentration. 
Thereafter, the attention to the ownership concentration has triggered many empirical 
studies to find out the effects of ownership concentration on shareholders' 
participation, performance and decisions of corporations that have many 
shareholders and experience the separation of ownership and control. For example, 
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scholars try to find out the relationship between ownership concentration and profit 
rates or Tobin's Q of companies, they also try to figure out how the ownership 
concentration affects shareholders' participation in voting and the probability of 
facing takeover. The literature review of these studies is presented in the following. 
Empirical research-relationship between ownership concentration and 
shareholders 'participation 
Brickley et al (1987) involves an empirical research to investigate the relationship 
between the ownership concentration and votes on management-initiated 
antitakeover amendments. Its study bases on the theory suggests that shareholders 
who own blocks of stock have a stronger incentive to invest in voting on corporate 
issues than nonblockholders. Its theory actually is similar to that of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986). To test this theory, Brickley et al (1987) examines 201 firms that 
voted on a set of management-initiated charter amendments proposing antitakeover 
provisions in 1984. According to its regression results, institutional investors and 
outside blockholders vote more actively on these amendments than nonblockholders. 
Its finding supports the view that ownership concentration among institutional 
investors and other outside blockholders increases the incentives to invest to 
participate in the voting process. Furthermore, Brickley et al (1987) finds that the 
positive relation between the level of institutional stock ownership and the 
percentage of no-votes cast is stronger when the proposals are met with negative 
stock returns. That means if the shareholder holds more shares of a firm, his 
opposition to the proposal is greater when the proposal reduces shareholders' wealth. 
What this paper does can provide indirect evidence on the relation between 
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ownership concentration and the incentives to monitor managers. Its findings support 
the idea of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). That is, large shareholders are more willing to 
monitor managers in a firm. 
Empirical research-relationship between ownership concentration and likelihood of 
hostile takeover 
Shivdasani (1991) tries to examine the relationship between the ownership 
concentration and the likelihood of hostile takeovers. It employs the disciplinary 
view of corporate takeover in the study. That means takeover targets represent cases 
where the internal governance mechanisms have been ineffective. Hence, if a firm's 
internal monitoring is enough, the probability of being hostile takeover target is 
lower. From the data analysis, Shivdasani (1991) finds that hostile targets have 
smaller board ownership, in contrast, the nontargets have greater board ownership. It 
supports the idea of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that owners with more shares have 
higher incentives to monitor the management, that is the internal governance 
mechanism (board of directors) functions well with smaller free-rider problem 
among owners in control. 
At the same time, Shivdasani (1991) finds that ownership by blockholders 
unaffiliated with management raises the likelihood of a hostile takeover attempt. In 
other words, these blockholders tend to support or even initiate a hostile takeover in 
their firm if they think the internal governance mechanism fails. However, the 
ownership by blockholders affiliated with management decreases the likelihood of a 
hostile takeover attempt. They try to deter hostile takeover even the internal 
mechanism fails. These results suggest that the board of directors and hostile 
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takeovers are substitute mechanisms and that unaffiliated blockholdings and hostile 
takeovers are complementary mechanisms for corporate control. 
Once again, the idea of better monitoring with higher ownership concentration is 
proved. Later on, scholars try to prove this idea by using other issues in corporations, 
such as the leverage ratio of corporations. 
Empirical research-relationship between ownership concentration and leverage 
ratio 
Financed by debt through issuing bonds is commonly regarded as a way to discipline 
managers in a firm. It is in part because creditors have control right when the firm 
defaults, and in part because they typically lend short term, so borrower (firm) has to 
come back at regular, short intervals for more funds. It urges managers to work better 
as the performance of a firm influence creditors' decision for further lending to the 
firm. Since issuing bonds and having more creditors can discipline managers too, 
high leverage level and large shareholders can be viewed as substitutes in monitoring 
management. If leverage ratio is found negatively related with the existence of large 
shareholders in a firm, it can directly give evidence to the idea that large shareholders 
monitor management well, so it is no need to use high leverage ratio to discipline 
managers. Accordingly, scholars try to do some empirical researches on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and leverage level. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) finds out the negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt ratio in a firm. It sets up a regression model by using "market 
leverage ratio" as the dependent variable and finds that the coefficients of the three 
19 
independent variables "individual-largest”，"corporate-largest" and "five largest" are 
also negative. That means if a firm's ownership is concentrated to an individual 
shareholder or to a corporate shareholder or to the top five investors, the leverage 
level is also lower than the one in a firm without concentrated ownership. It explains 
the result by the idea that concentrated ownership structure induces a higher level of 
monitoring, so debt financing used to mitigate the moral hazard problem and 
discipline managers is less widely adopted, thus the leverage ratio is lower with the 
existence of concentrated shareholdings. 
However, Zeckhauser and Pound (1989) finds no significant difference between the 
leverage ratio of the firms with large shareholders and the one of the firms without 
large shareholders. This paper points out another idea about debt financing besides 
the concept mentioned above. That is debt financing can monitor managers, at the 
same time it creates other agency costs and bankruptcy costs. If there are large 
shareholders whose monitoring effort can ensure the management dose not shift a 
firm's investment policy from those projects preferred by creditors，then the costs of 
debt can be reduced, thus debt may be more widely used. Hence, leverage ratio may 
be higher with the existence of large shareholders. That means the monitoring from 
large shareholders may increase or decrease the use of debt in a firm. Therefore, 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1989) states that the positive and the negative relationship 
between the existence of large shareholders and the leverage ratio will cancel off 
each other, so no relationship between the two things can be found. 
All empirical researches mentioned above can directly or indirectly give evidence to 
the idea of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). These researches also support that 
concentrated ownership can guarantee the existence of better monitoring 
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management in firms. With the more careful monitoring, the corporate performance 
should be better. To find out if it is true in the real world, many scholars try to do 
empirical researches on the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate performance. During these several decades, many studies are about the 
relationship between concentrated shareholdings and the performance of a firm. 
Some of them are summarized as the follow. 
No relationship between ownership concentration and performance 
Among the empirical research, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) proves that ownership 
concentration is not related with the performance of firms. This paper uses a linear 
regression to show that there is no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and the accounting profit rates of firms, especially no significant 
positive relationship. 
Piecewise relationship between ownership concentration and performance 
However, Morck et al (1988) does not agree with Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Morck 
et al (1988) think that using a simple linear relationship to describe the relation 
between ownership concentration and firms' performance is not enough. It is because 
it states that a nonmonotonicity exists in the relationship between ownership 
concentration and the profitability of a firm. Therefore, Morck et al (1988) suggests a 
piecewise linear regression to estimate how ownership concentration affects 
corporate performance. Its regression result shows that the performance indicator 
Tobin's Q firstly increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as ownership 
concentration rises. 
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Morck et al (1988) declares that this regression result can be explained by the 
presence of two effects and each of them dominates in different range of ownership 
concentration. It proposes two hypotheses to account for these two effects. It calls the 
first hypothesis "convergence-of-interests hypothesis" which predicts that a firm's 
market value increases with rising ownership concentration. In this paper, the 
concentration index of each firm is calculated by using board ownership and board is 
regarded as the management of a firm. Then, when a concentration index is higher, 
that is the management has more shares of a firm, managers themselves have more 
incentive to manage the firm and increase the firm's value. Morck et al (1988) 
believes that this hypothesis dominates in the first and the last range of a firm's 
ownership concentration. Therefore, the Tobin's Q rises with increasing ownership 
concentration in these two ranges. On the other hand, Morck et al (1988) claims that 
the second hypothesis "entrenchment hypothesis" dominates in the middle range of 
corporate ownership concentration. This hypothesis suggests that market valuation of 
a firm can be adversely affected for a certain range of high ownership stakes. It is 
because a manager who controls a substantial fraction of a firm's equity can have 
enough voting power and influence more to guarantee his or her benefits in a firm. 
That means that a large shareholder may probably divert a firm's resources to benefit 
him or her rather than to maximize a firm's value. 
The main contribution of Morck et al (1988) is that it develops a "piecewise idea" in 
studying the relationship between ownership concentration and performance of 
corporations. It points out that it is not true that increasing concentrated shareholding 
can always improve the performance of a firm. Actually, the relationship between 
concentrated ownership and corporate performance can be positive or negative, 
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depending on the degree of initial ownership concentration a firm has. 
Among the studies of this empirical issue, most of their samples comprise only US 
companies. Hence, this thesis tries to use a sample of corporations in Hong Kong - an 
Asian economy - as its studying subject. Looking at Hong Kong corporations, it is 
not difficult to find that a good number of them are held and controlled by families. 
In fact, this has been pointed out in a recent paper written by Porta et al in 1999. 
Their paper investigates the corporate ownership of publicly traded firms in 27 
countries. It shows that controlling shareholders are indeed present in many large 
companies and these large shareholders may be states, widely held financial 
companies, widely held nonfinancial companies, or families. One of its findings is 
that Hong Kong companies, on average, have more concentrated ownership 
comparing with the firms in the other 26 countries. Its another finding is that in Hong 
Kong the concentrated ownership is usually in the hand of a family rather than a 
financial institution or the state. Therefore, Hong Kong is used as a case study to see 
the relationship between the concentrated ownership in hands of families and the 
corporate performance. 
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis 
Many factors may affect the performance of family businesses. This thesis tries to 
study two of them. The first one is the presence of family relationship among 
directors. The second one is the existence of concentrated ownership held by family 
members. These two criteria met by family businesses are supposed to have effects 
on the corporate performance. However, do they really affect the performance of 
family businesses significantly? If yes, how are their effects? Hence, the main 
concern of this thesis is finding out the answers for these questions by doing an 
empirical research with Hong Kong data. 
Before finding out the answers of the questions, it is better to state again the 
definition of family businesses more clearly. 
3.1 Definition of Family Business 
As mentioned above, there is no common definition for family business among 
scholars. Hence, a simple and easily understood one is set up in the thesis. A family 
business is defined as a firm in which majority ownership lies within a single family 
where two or more family members are directly involved in the business by having 
seats in board in a firm. Who are the family members? In this thesis, family members 
include all relatives of a director in a firm, such as his or her parents, wife or husband, 
sibling，uncles and aunts, nephews and cousins and all his or her relatives by 
marriage. Then what is the minimal amount of shareholding can be regarded as a 
majority ownership? Actually, there is no common determination of it. In the thesis, 
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three minimal amounts of shareholding regarded as majority ownership are used. 
They are 10 percent, 20 percent and 35 percent of shareholding. That means when 
ten (20 or 35) percent of shareholding is used as the minimal amount, a single family 
who holds 10 (20 or 35) percent or more of a firm's shares is claimed as having a 
majority ownership of the firm. 
The cutoff of 35 percent is used because it is a critical percentage of holding a firm in 
Hong Kong. In the document called "Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on 
the SEHK”，a controlling shareholder is defined as any person, or a group of persons, 
who is entitled to exercise or control the exercise of 35 percent or more of the voting 
power at general meetings of the issuer. Moreover, 35 percent of shareholding is an 
amount specified in the Takeover Code, which is set up by Securities and Futures 
Commission, as being the level for triggering a mandatory general offer. In sum, it is 
a common belief that a person or a group of persons holding 35 percent of shares has 
controlling power towards the company. Therefore, if a family owns 35 percent or 
more of a firm's shares, this firm can be viewed as being owned and controlled by the 
family. 
Besides 35 percent, this thesis tries to use 10 percent and 20 percent as the cutoff 
points too. It is because Porta et al (1999) studying corporate ownership around the 
world have tried to employ these two percentages of shareholding as the cutoff points. 
Porta et al (1999) state that most countries mandate disclosure of 10 percent 
ownership stakes. Thus, it seems that having 10 percent of shareholding starts to 
have controlling power in a firm. Besides, they think that having 20 percent of 
shareholding is usually enough to have an effective control of a firm. Therefore, the 
two cutoffs, 10 percent and 20 percent, are also used as the minimal amounts of 
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shareholding to define the majority ownership in the definition of family business. 
After defining family businesses, it is time to see how the two criteria met by family 
businesses may affect corporate performance. 
3.2 Existence of Family Relationship among Directors 
Some scholars believe that altruism usually exists among family members. They also 
claim that altruism can make relatives to internalize the externalities among 
themselves, though efficiency can be improved. If this is true, family businesses may 
have better performance. The hypothesis behind this idea is that related directors 
have incentive to internalize part of the positive externality of their effort at 
controlling a firm among themselves. Their incentive of the internalization can be 
thought as a result of the existence of altruism in their family. With the internalized 
external benefit, the related directors are willing to put more effort to control a firm. 
In other words, every related director is willing to work harder in the firm，so the 
performance of the firm where some controlling shareholders are relatives should be 
better. In more precise language, if there are two firms where everything including 
their ownership concentration are the same except some directors of one of them are 
relatives, then the firm with relatives is supposed to perform better than the other 
one. 
In order to explain the hypothesis and illustrate how the positive externality of effort 
is internalized in family businesses, the positive externality of effort should be 
explained first. The situations of an entrepreneurial firm and a listed non-family 
business are used to show what the positive externality of effort is and how it exists 
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in a firm. After that, an explanation and a simple model are used to show how the 
internalization works in family businesses. 
Entrepreneurial firm having no positive externality 
If a firm is wholly owned and completely managed by the same person, this firm will 
have no corporate governance problems and its manager-owner, or called 
entrepreneur, should be willing to do his best and put all his effort to maximize the 
firm's value. It is because when he owns all shares of the firm, he can capture all 
benefits of his effort made to manage the firm. No other people can benefit from his 
contribution. That means there is no positive externality of his effort diffusing to 
other people in the firm. 
In order to maximize income earned from his firm, the manager-owner puts effort to 
manage and control the firm until his marginal benefit of effort is equal to his 
marginal cost of effort. This effort level chosen by the manager-owner is surely an 
optimal one for him as well as for the firm. It is because there is no positive 
externality of his effort at managing the firm, so there is no distortion in making the 
best decision of effort level for the entrepreneur and the firm. 
Ignoring the positive externality in listed non-family businesses 
Many companies in real world, however, are usually owned by more than one person. 
Particularly, in order to raise more capital to finance corporate investment and have 
liquid capital markets, companies may go public. All these publicly traded 
companies have many owners and tend to have diffuse ownership. According to the 
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notion of Berle and Means (1932), this diffuse ownership causes many corporate 
governance problems since it separates ownership of residual claims from control of 
corporate decision. In listed companies with diffuse ownership, many shareholders 
have small fractions of shares only. Under one share-one vote regulation, they are not 
influential enough to a firm's decision. However, the firm's decision directly 
determines the firm's performance on which their income depends directly. Some 
owners may own relatively larger portions of a firm, so they have more voting power 
and are able to determine the firm's decision. They are supposed to have seats in 
board and monitor the management of a firm. 
Once there is more than one person owning a firm and supposed to control the firm, 
there is a free-rider problem. It is because when one of the owners puts effort to 
monitor the management and control a firm, all other owners can benefit even they 
have not put any effort. That is if one owner works hard in a firm to ensure a good 
corporate performance, the market valuation of the firm will be high. Hence, all 
shares of the firm become more valuable and every shareholder can benefit by 
holding these valuable shares. In other words, not only the owner who works hard 
can be the beneficiary, but other owners without putting effort can also get advantage. 
This advantage, actually, is known as the external benefit of owner's effort in a firm. 
That means an owner's effort can unintentionally produce a benefit to other owners 
when he, actually, just wants to increase his own income by putting effort to work in 
a firm. Rationally, every owner prefers being a free rider to a hard-working owner. 
Note, however, that even all owners are not free riders and willing to put effort, the 
effort levels they contribute to a firm are not optimal to the company. It is because 
each owner's effort can produce the external benefit on other owners as well as on the 
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whole firm, but no one has incentive to consider such positive externality when they 
make decision about their own effort levels. 
To maximize his own utility in a firm, each individual owner will just put effort to 
control the firm until his marginal benefit of effort equals his marginal cost of effort. 
Obviously, the marginal benefit is the amount of the incremental value of each share 
multiplying the number of shares he owns. And the marginal cost he has to pay is the 
leisure time he forgoes to make the additional effort. Hence, sticking to the rule of 
equalizing own marginal benefit and marginal cost of effort, each owner can find the 
optimal level of effort he should have. Note, however, that this level is only optimal 
to the owner himself, but not to the whole company since the positive externality of 
effort mentioned above is not taken into consideration by the owner. If all owners 
also consider the external benefit of their effort, it is believed that they must work 
harder and their effort level will be the optimal one to their firm. Then their firm's 
performance will be much better. 
Nonetheless, it is not easy to impel owners to attain the optimal effort level for their 
firm as it is really difficult to induce them to internalize the positive externality of 
their effort. The hypothesis in this thesis proposes that such positive externality of 
effort may be internalized via family relationship among directors who monitor a 
firm. With such internalization of the external benefit of effort, it is expected that 
listed family businesses may perform better since some of their owners on board are 
willing to work harder. 
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Internalizing the positive externality in listed family businesses 
Listed family business is one type of publicly traded corporation. They are similar 
but not exactly the same with other publicly traded firms. They are similar in the 
sense that they are also publicly traded and owned by many shareholders, thus they 
also face the issue of positive externality of their owners' effort. On the other hand, 
listed family businesses are different from publicly traded firms because some 
controlling owners on board of a listed family business are relatives. The family 
relationship of these related directors is supposed to have a function of inducing them 
to internalize the external benefit that is generated from their effort to the other 
related directors in the firm. 
In order to find out a desirable amount of effort to control a firm，each of the related 
directors in a listed family business considers not only the benefit of his effort he can 
get，but also the benefit generated from his effort to the other related directors. Why 
dose a director also consider his relatives' benefit in a firm when he makes decision 
about his effort level to control a firm? Some people believe that the existence of 
altruism within a family is the reason. Altruism suggests that one's happiness depend 
on the happiness of someone else. In the same way, people may think that a director's 
utility in a firm depends on the corporate benefit of other directors related to him just 
because he is altruistic. 
However, why dose the altruist only consider the benefit of the directors who have 
family relationship with him? To understand the reason, people should look into the 
special condition within a family. Just like what Becker (1981) says, within a family, 
members usually have many interactions and are very interdependent among 
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themselves during their whole lives. Each member's living and self-interests do 
highly depend on those of other members. For instance, in order to have somebody 
they can depend on in their old ages, parents are willing to raise their children and 
give them better livings. To rephrase it, parents' livings in the evening of their lives 
depend on the present livings of their children. Moreover, the help people can get 
from their sibling depend on the help their sibling can get from them. Finally, two 
consequences are brought about by such special condition in a family. The first one is 
family members discern that cooperation among themselves is very important. It is 
even much more important than a competition. Hence, they would like to cooperate 
in many circumstances. They do it not because of their kindness, but the actual 
benefit they can get from it, The second consequence of the special condition among 
family members is that they tend to consider their relatives' benefits in their decision 
making. It is because their relatives' benefits can in return affect their utilities. This 
idea is similar to Becker's "Rotten Kid Theorem"^ According to the idea of Becker 
(1981)，no matter how selfish family members are, they are willing to internalize the 
effects of their actions since they can get benefit from it. 
No matter the altruism is real or rooted in selfishness, there is a tendency for family 
members to consider their relatives' benefit and internalize the external effects 
influencing their relatives when they make decisions. 
Consequently, in a family business, a director tends to consider the benefit of the 
related directors when he makes his effort decision. The most obvious example is 
that when a son thinks about how much effort he should put in order to maximize his 
utility in a firm, he also considers the effect of his effort on his father's corporate 
income. It is because a son usually can get a subsidy or a transfer from his father's 
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pocket. Moreover, after the death of his father, a son can get what his father 
possesses now, involving a firm and a firm's profit. Thus, a son simply treats his 
father's benefit as his own when he makes decision in a firm, including his decision 
of how much effort he should put in a firm. In other words，he is willing to 
internalize the external effect of his effort on his father's income from a firm. 
So far, the reason of internalizing the external benefit of one's own action to his 
relatives is known. It is time to show how a director internalizes the positive 
externality of his effort and to prove these related directors do put more effort at 
controlling a company. In doing so, a simple model is used here. This model is 
similar but not exactly the same with the one of Becker (1976) which has set up an 
economic model for altruism. In the model of Becker (1976), the utility function of 
an altruist h is written as 
Uh 二 uh(Xh，Xi) 
where X h and X i are the own consumption of h and other family member i 
respectively. That means an altruist's utility depends on other members' consumption. 
This is similar to the idea that the utility of a director also depends on the benefit of 
the other related directors in the firm. The model used in present study is shown as 
below. 
It is supposed that there are many shareholders in a listed family business. Some of 
them hold larger fractions of shares, so they have more power and control the firm by 
having seats in board. Among these directors, some of them are relatives. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two related directors A and B in the 
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company and all the other directors are unrelated. Both A and B have their own 
shareholdings of the firm. Suppose a and /5 are the percentages of shares owned 
by A and B respectively. Also, each of them has a utility function that is written as 
u = u ( Y，L ) 
where L is leisure time and Y is income. It is assumed that A and B's income is only 
from the profit of a firm which they have shareholdings. In fact, firm's profit depends 
on many variables, such as price of output, cost of input and other unexpected 
variables in the market. However, the main focus in this thesis is each director's 
effort level that affects firm's profit. So the profit function of a firm is set to be 
n 二 n ( e , c ) 
where e is vector of effort level in term of time used of all directors and 一 is 
de 
positive, and where c is all other variables determining firm's profit. With a firm's 
profit function, A's income can be written as 
Y a = a • K ( c a , cb , e ') 
where a is a constant which is the percentage of shares held by owner A. It indicates 
the size of his ownership of the firm and determines the portion of the firm's income 
A can get. For ca and ee, they are the amounts of effort director A and director B 
make to control the firm respectively. And e’ is the effort of other directors in the 
firm. Likewise, B's income is 
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Yb 二 • TT ( ee., eA，e') 
where 冷 is a constant which is the percentage of shares held by director B，and ee is 
the amount of effort director B makes to control the firm. 
Now with the assumptions and the setting mentioned above, director A tries to find 
out his optimal effort level which maximizes his utility. His maximizing problem is 
set as follow 
M a x U A = U A ( Y ’ A ， L A ) 
s.t. Y ' a = Y a + ^ Y b 
LA =k-eA 
where k is the total time director A has and it can be spent on two activities including 
controlling the firm and having leisure, and where Ya is director A's income which 
equals a • tt ( ca , cb , e ') and Yb is director B’s income which equals /5 • K ( es.， 
eA ,e' ). Note that director A's utility depends on Y a which is more than Ya. It is 
because the income which director A cares about comprises two parts. One is Ya 
which is director A's direct income from the firm where he has a of the ownership. 
The other part of income director A cares about is Yb though it is not A's direct 
income. Director A also considers B's income because B is his relative. The reason 
why A does this has been explained before. The most simple reason is that there is a 
transfer or a subsidy from B's pocket to A's. How much is the transfer is indicated by 
6 . Sometimes, director A's benefit from B's income may not be so concrete, but the 
size of this benefit still can be represented by ^ .Thus，6 is the portion of B's income 
which will be transferred to A or which will affect A's utility through other means. 
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It should be noted that the presence of altruism, no matter the true or the fake one, in 
this model is represented by Q . This is a little bit different from the model used by 
Becker (1976) where the altruism exists as altruist's utility function directly involves 
others' consumption. 
As director A and B are relatives, they always have interaction and get benefit from 
or give benefit to each other, so Q here should be greater than 0 and in the most 
extreme case, Q can be equal to 1. However, if jealousy does exist among related 
directors, 6* may be considered as negative by them. The detailed explanation is 
given later. Thus, 6 can be positive or negative, which depends on how related 
directors perceive the condition of their relationship. 
When director A makes decision about his optimal effort level, he considers also 
director B’s income in the proportion of 6 . This part can be treated as A's indirect 
income. In order to find out his optimal effort level, director A solves the 
maximizing problem. Here, the maximizing problem can be rewritten as 
Max U a = U a [a • tt ( c a , ee , e') + ^ • ^ • tt ( ee., c a , e ' ) , k - ca " 
After simplifying, it would be 
Max Ua = Ua [ ( a + G • 0) • n ( ca , cb , e') , k - c a . 
eA 
To find the utility-maximizing effort level, the first order condition has to be satisfied. 
That means the first derivative with respect to ca should be set to zero. That is 
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dU^ ( 丄 」 m dUA d;r dUA , 
- = ( a + 0 •召） - - = 0 
de^ d;r de^ de^ 
Thus, a necessary condition for director A to maximize his utility is 
, 丄 D o � d l l A dTT d U ^ 
( a + 6' • /5) = -
d;r de^ de^ 
where (a + 0 • j3) ^^^ ^^ is the marginal benefit of his optimal effort level 
d;r de^ 
CA* at controlling a firm and ^ ^ is the marginal cost of his optimal effort level et 
deA 
at controlling a firm. They must be the same when director A wants to maximize 
his utility. 
It should be noted that the marginal benefit of ca* depends on several constants, 
they are a , (9 and /3 . If any one of them increases, the marginal benefit of director 
A's effort will be higher, then optimal effort level of director A must increase. If 0 
in this case is the portion of income or advantage a director can get from the related 
directors in a firm, it should be positive. This usually occurs in family businesses. 
Nevertheless, in other publicly held firms where all controlling directors are not 
related, G is zero. Then the marginal benefit of every director's effort in such firm is 
dU dir a  
6.71 de 
yet, the marginal benefit of a related director's effort in a family business is 
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, ^ m dU dn： 
(a ^ 9 ' /3)-—— 
d/r de 
If the marginal utility of effort ^ ^ ^ ^ and the ownership percentage a are the same 
d/r de 
for a related director and an unrelated director, then it is obvious that the marginal 
benefit of a related director's effort is greater than the one of an unrelated director's 
effort. Hence, some directors in family business should have higher marginal benefit 
of effort and they should be willing to put more effort to control a company than 
those in a non-family owned firm where directors are usually unrelated. With higher 
effort put by some directors and other things being the same, a listed family business 
may have better performance than a listed non-family business may. 
A diagram can be used to illustrate the higher effort level of a related director in a 
family business. 
$ 
MB of unrelated director' effort 
y / M B of related director's effort 
X \ M C of effort 
： ； • 
e unrelated 6 relate 已汗O""^  level 
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In the above diagram, a related director shares the same marginal cost curve of effort 
with a unrelated director. Yet, a related director has higher marginal benefit of effort. 
Hence, his marginal benefit curve of effort is at the right of the one for a non-related 
director. At the optimal effort level, the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit 
of effort. Accordingly, the two optimal effort levels for both related director (e*reiated) 
and unrelated director (e unrelated) can be found. It can be seen that the former one is 
higher than the latter one. That means a related director will put more effort than an 
unrelated director will. Since there should be some related directors in family 
business willing to put more effort, family business can have higher probability to 
get better performance. 
In fact, the higher marginal benefit mentioned above is the consequence of partly 
internalizing the positive externality of a director's effort in a firm. This idea of 
internalization is similar to the one conclusion of Becker (1981) about altruism. Look 
at director A's marginal benefit of his optimal effort level. The direct benefit of his 




and the part left is 
• 
d/r de^ 
which can be viewed as a part of marginal external benefit of director A's effort and 
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now it is also a fraction of A's marginal benefit of his effort because A has already 
internalized the amount of ((9 • ^ ) of the positive externality of his effort in a firm. 
He has not fully internalized the externality since he is not a real altruist. He only 
cares about the related director B’s benefit. More precisely, he cares about the portion 
6 of the related director B's benefit as he can only benefit from 9 of B's corporate 
income. 
All in all, what mentioned above is only from director A's point of view, but all the 
things derived and the explanation proposed above can be applied to director B's 
situation too. That means when B decides his optimal effort level to maximize his 
utility, he is also willing to internalize part of A's benefit derived from B's effort. 
Moreover, the model suggested here can be extended to a case with more than two 
related directors in a family business. In such circumstance, each director's utility 
depends on more than one related director's corporate income. That is each director 
internalizes the external benefit of his effort to more than one related director. 
To conclude, with the model and the explanation proposed above, it is supposed that 
a listed family business may have better performance since some of its directors are 
willing to put more effort to control the firm. It is because these directors are 
relatives and they have an incentive to internalize part of the external benefit of their 
effort to the related directors. 
However, besides altruism, scholars admit that envy is also common in a family. If 
there is envy existing among family members, this can be conducive to internecine 
feuds. As a result, directors in the same family, of course, are not willing to 
internalize the external benefit of their effort among themselves. Thus, in the model, 
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Q cannot be positive. In contrast, they may do all they can to destroy the related and 
envied directors' interests in a firm because the envied director' benefit makes the 
envious director feel uncomfortable. It seems that the envied director' income from 
the firm is a loss for the envious director. Therefore, in an extreme case, Q in the 
model may be negative. That means the envious director thinks that the related and 
envied director's income decreases his utility through producing a negative effect on 
his income. With the negative Q，the marginal benefit of an envious director in 
family business is smaller than the one of other unrelated director. 
With the smaller marginal benefit of effort, the envious director finds that he should 
put less effort to control the firm comparing with other unrelated directors. This may 
imply that some directors in family business may work less hard because of the 
conflicts and feuds among related directors. They are even willing to sacrifice their 
own incomes to lower the envied directors' income by doing some irrational decision， 
such as putting less effort in monitoring a firm owned by their whole family. 
In short, family businesses monitored by some related directors may have better 
performance or worse performance than other firms where directors have no family 
relationship. To see how the existence of family relationship among directors affects 
corporate performance, an empirical research should be carried out. 
3.3 Concentrated Ownership among Family Members 
Besides the presence of family relationship, another criterion met by family 
businesses may also affect corporate performance. A firm is regarded as a family 
business when a family possesses a large shareholding of the firm. That means there 
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must be concentrated ownership in a family business. In fact, there are already many 
papers about ownership concentration among the controllers of firms. Scholars 
believe that controllers of a firm with large shareholdings may act differently from 
those owning small shares. They think that large shareholders as controllers of firms 
may work harder to improve firm's performance. However, some point out that 
owners with large shareholdings may also do something that is harmful to a firm. 
Several of their researches are mentioned in the literature review, so their ideas are 
just summarized and used in this part rather than developing a model to explain the 
effect of concentrated ownership on corporate performance. Actually, large 
shareholder of a firm may be corporation or state. However, in Hong Kong, such 
large shareholders are usually families. In order words, a certain number of firms 
with concentrated ownership in Hong Kong are family businesses. 
During these several decades, many studies about the relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance have been carried out. No matter 
what results these studies can find, they mainly base on two assumptions of the effect 
of concentrated ownership on corporate performance. The first assumption supports 
that the more concentrated ownership a firm possesses, the better a firm performs. It 
is because if an owner has more shares of a firm, his wealth will be more dependent 
on the value of the firm's shares. Then he will have higher incentive to control the 
firm in order to ensure the firm performs well and has high value. As a result, a firm 
with concentrated ownership can have a better performance than a diffusely held firm 
can. Morck et al (1988) calls this assumption as "convergence-of-interests 
hypothesis". Since family businesses have concentrated ownership, they may have 
better performance. 
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The second assumption, on the other hand, suggests that concentrated ownership may 
bring about worse corporate performance. It is because when an owner holds many 
shares, he can have more voting power and more direct access to corporate resources. 
Hence, it is easier and less costly for a large shareholder to consume corporate 
resources. If it is the case, large shareholder's aim is no longer only maximizing 
firm's value, but also making expropriation. Without doubt, a firm with such large 
shareholder will have worse performance. Morck et al (1988) calls this assumption as 
"entrenchment hypothesis". Hence, family businesses with concentrated ownership 
may make expropriation at the expense of other small shareholders and corporate 
performance. As a result, the performance of family businesses may be worse. 
It seems that both assumptions are rational and reasonable, they may also be able to 
explain the situation in real world. If the effect of the first assumption dominates, 
family businesses should perform better; if the effect of the second assumption 
dominates, family businesses should perform rather badly. Accordingly, listed family 
businesses with concentrated ownership may perform better or even more badly. 
How dose the concentrated ownership affect family business? It should be an 
empirical question. 
In brief, whether the performance of family businesses, which meet the two criteria, 
is better than the one of non-family businesses should be found out empirically. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
This chapter introduces a methodology used to test the hypotheses mentioned in the 
last chapter. In order to see if family businesses really perform better and the two 
criteria met by family businesses really affect corporate performance or not, a simple 
data analysis and regression models are used. 
4.1 Simple Data Analysis 
For the data analysis, all observations in the sample are classified into family 
businesses and non-family businesses. After that, the average performance of each 
group is figured out and comparisons can be made. 
Family businesses vs. non-family businesses 
In order to distinguish family businesses from non-family businesses, a family 
business index is set up. This index is actually a dummy variable which takes on a 
value of either one and zero. If the index of a firm is one, it means that this firm is a 
family business. If the index is zero, it means the firm is a non-family business. To 
figure out the value of the index for each firm, two things of every firm in the sample 
should be found out. Firstly, the family relationship among all directors in every firm 
is checked out. This information can be found by looking at the biographical details 
in annual reports of listed companies. Note that disclosing of directors' relationships 
is not legally mandatory. However, many companies willingly disclose such 
information. Actually, annual reports are the only sources of such information shown 
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to the public. Business registration records do not contain information on family 
relationship among shareholders or board directors. Published papers, such as Porta 
(1999), studying corporate ownership structure in Hong Kong also rely on annual 
reports for family relationship information. The results of family relationship among 
directors in the sample are shown in tableS. 
Once two or more directors in a firm are relatives, this firm meets the first criterion 
of being a family business. Then the next thing should be found out is the family's 
shareholding of the firm where some directors are relatives. A family's shareholding 
is calculated by summing up the shareholding percentages of all related directors on 
board. It is a legal requirement for all listed companies in Hong Kong to show their 
directors' shareholdings in annual reports. The Exchange Listing Rules require 
companies to show the total number or amount of securities in which each director 
and chief executive is interested, and their interests are distinguished into four 
categories. They are personal interests, family interests, corporate interests and other 
interests. Thus, it is not difficult to find out the total shareholdings of all related 
directors. Actually, not all firms can have the data of families' shareholdings because 
some of them do not have related directors. The information of families' 
shareholdings is shown in table2 and will be discussed in Chapter five. If a family's 
shareholding of a firm is equal to or over a certain amount of percentage, the value of 
its family business index is one, which means that this firm is regarded as family 
business. 
There are three different amount of percentage of the family's shareholding used to 
define family business in this thesis. They are 10 percent, 20 percent and 35 percent. 
The reason of using them has been already explained before. In order words, there 
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are three family business indexes in this thesis. They are called "FamlO", "Fam20" 
and 'Tam35". Specifically, "FamlO" ( "Fam20" or 'Tam35" ) of a firm equals one if 
the firm has two or more related directors who hold 10 ( 20 or 35 ) percent or more 
of the shareholdings together. The values of these three family business indexes of 
the firms in the sample are shown in table2 and the detailed procedure of figuring 
them out can be seen in appendix one under the subtitle "Fam35". 
After finding out the values of family business indexes, the 62 firms can be classified 
into family business and non-family business. Then the average performance of 
family businesses and non-family businesses can be calculated and compared. The 
results of comparison will be presented in Chapter six. In this thesis, the corporate 
performance is indicated by ROE. ROE stands for "returns on equity", which is 
calculated by multiplying a ratio of annual corporate returns to equity with 100 
percent. More explanation for this corporate performance indicator can be found in 
appendix one. 
With family relationship vs. without family relationship 
Besides comparing the average performance between family businesses and 
non-family businesses, the average performance of different groups in accordance to 
the two criteria met by family businesses are also compared. Firstly, the 62 firms in 
the sample are classified into two groups. One includes the firms with related 
directors and the other group includes those without related directors. Then the 
average performance of each group is calculated and compared, which will be 
presented in Chapter six. The result can show whether firms with related directors 
can perform better or not. This may imply if family relationship can impose positive 
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effect on corporate performance of family businesses or not. 
With concentrated ownership vs. without concentrated ownership 
To see the effect of second criterion, which is the concentrated ownership held by 
family, met by family businesses, the 62 firms should be classified into different 
groups according to the sizes of their families' shareholdings and then the average 
performance of each group can be calculated and compared. However, not all the 62 
firms are family businesses, so not all of them have the data of families' 
shareholdings. Therefore, it is not possible to see how family's shareholding itself 
makes the performance of family businesses different from non-family businesses. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to compare the performance of firms having 
concentrated ownership with those having dispersed ownership. 
Different scholars use different concentration indexes to indicate the degree of 
ownership concentration in their studies. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use 
the percentage of shares controlled by the top five and the top 20 shareholders in 
their models and Morck et al (1988) use the percentage of shares held by all board 
members of a firm. The concentration index used here is the same with the one of 
Morck et al (1988). The board ownership of each firm is calculated by adding up the 
shareholding percentages of all directors in a firm. Such information of the 62 firms 
can be found in their annual reports. The result of their board ownership is shown in 
table2 and will be discussed in Chapter five. 
After finding out the board ownership, the 62 firms are classified into several groups 
according to their board ownership and then their average performance of each group 
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can be calculated and compared. It can show whether firms with concentrated 
ownership can have better performance on average or not. The results of the 
comparison will be presented in Chapter six. 
Note, however, that the results found by data analysis may not be so accurate and 
creditable. It is because even if the average performance of the firms classified as 
family businesses is better, such better performance may just be due to other 
uncontrolled variables which can also affect the corporate performance. Hence, 
regression should be used to investigate if family businesses can really perform better. 
It is because other factors, which also influence the corporate performance, can be 
controlled in regression. 
4.2 Regression Models 
Effect of being family business on corporate performance 
In order to see the effect of being family business on corporate performance, the 
family indexes mentioned in above are used as dummy variables in the following 
regressions separately. They are: 
ROE 二 a + 1 FamlO + control variables 
ROE = ct-\-13 \ Fam20 + control variables 
ROE = a ^ I 3 \ Fam35 + control variables 
where ROE stands for "returns on equity", which is calculated by multiplying a ratio 
of annual corporate returns to equity with 100 percent. It is used to measure 
corporate performance. More explanation for this corporate performance indicator 
can be found in appendix one. 
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As mentioned before, "FamlO" is a family business index. It is also a dummy 
variable which equals one if two or more related directors having 10 percent or more 
of the shareholdings together. It is equal to zero if either only one director has 10 or 
more percent of the shareholding but no family relationship with other directors or 
the related directors in board only has less than 10 percent of the shareholdings. This 
variable tries to capture the effect of being a family business, which meets the two 
criteria, on the corporate performance. In more precise language, "FamlO" tries to 
capture the effect of family relationship and concentrated ownership held by family 
on corporate performance. Besides 'Tarn 10", there are also “Fam20，，and 'Tam35" 
as the dummy variables. Their definitions are similar to "FamlO". The only 
difference is the minimal amount of family's shareholding used to define family 
business. Their definitions are also listed in table 1 in appendix three. 
The procedure of finding out the values of family business indexes for the 62 firms is 
mentioned before. To repeat, the relationship of directors is checked out first. If some 
of the directors are related in a firm, their shareholdings are added up to an amount to 
represent the family's shareholding. If the family's shareholding exceeds 10，20 and 
35 percent, then the value of ‘‘FamlO，，，'Tam20" and 'Tam35" is one respectively. 
The more detailed procedure of figuring them out can be found in appendix one. 
If the coefficient of "FamlO", "Fam20" or "Fam35" is positive with statistical 
significance, it implies that family businesses meeting the two criteria do perform 
better than non-family businesses. The regression result will be presented in Chapter 
six. All the control variables will be explained later. 
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Effects of family relationship and concentrated ownership on performance 
Besides the above regression models, the other regression is set up as follow: 
ROE = a + /5i Famrela + 2 Brdshare + control varaibles 
where "Famrela" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if two or more directors on 
board are from the same family no matter how much corporate ownership they have. 
It tries to capture the effect of the first criterion met by family business. That is the 
presence of family relationship among directors. If the coefficient of "Famrela" is 
positive with statistical significance, it can prove that a firm in which two or more 
directors have family relationship can perform better. In other words, this firm can 
have better performance than a firm where all board members are not related This 
may imply that the hypothesis, which suggests that related directors have incentive to 
internalize the external benefits of their effort at controlling firms, is valid. To repeat, 
if the coefficient of "Famrela" is positive with statistical significance, which implies 
that family businesses should have better performance partly because of the effect of 
family relationship among directors. 
To see the effect of concentrated ownership held by family on corporate performance, 
a variable indicating family's shareholding of each firm should be used in the 
regression. However, as mentioned before, not all firms have this information since 
not all of them are family businesses. Therefore, it is not possible to see the effect of 
concentrated ownership held by family on corporate performance directly. 
Nonetheless, it is still possible to study the effect of concentrated ownership on 
corporate performance. 
For capturing the effect of ownership concentration on corporate performance, 
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different scholars use different concentration indexes in their regressions. The 
concentration index used here is the board ownership "Brdshare". Board members 
� are responsible to control a firm and monitor the management of a firm. Some of the 
board members are just employees but most of them have shares of firms. 
Particularly, owners with large shareholdings usually have seats on board. If a family 
is a large shareholder, it should have representatives on board. In the sample, about 
two-third of the large board ownership of listed companies is due to the large 
family's shareholding. In some cases, the board ownership is exactly the same with 
the family's shareholding. However, not all firms with concentrated board ownership 
are family businesses. It is because some large board ownership is due to the 
existence of one large shareholder on board. According to the definition of a family 
business here, a firm largely held by one individual who has no relatives with 
shareholdings and seats on board is not family business. In the sample, about 
one-third of the firms with large board ownership are largely owned and controlled 
by individuals, but not two or more relatives in a family. 
The variable "Brdshare" is a percentage of shareholdings held by all board members 
in a firm. If the coefficient of "Brdshare" is positive with statistical significance, it 
proves that a firm with more concentrated ownership has better performance. It is 
consistent with the hypothesis that when owners' wealth is more dependent on 
corporate value and performance, they are more willing to put effort at controlling 
their firms. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that better performance of family 
businesses is partly due to the concentrated ownership. However, if the coefficient of 
"Brdshare" is negative with statistical significance, it proves that a firm with more 
concentrated ownership performs more badly than other diffusely held firms do. 
According to the hypothesis, the negative coefficient is due to the large shareholders' 
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expropriation of firms. Thus, concentrated ownership in family businesses may 
worsen the their performance instead of improving it. 
Control Variables 
To deal with the possibility that a variety of factors can jointly affect the performance 
indicator "ROE" besides the effects of ownership concentration and family 
relationship, the regression models involve some control variables. They are "Lnass", 
"founder", "history", "Prop", "Cong", "Bank”，"Ind" and ”Ut”. 
"Lnass" is a logarithm of annual total assets of a firm. It is used to control the size 
effect of a firm on corporate performance. People commonly believe that large firms 
may have higher returns since their turnovers are usually higher. Moreover, large 
firms may have greater competition power that can help firms to get higher returns. 
Hence, controlling the size effect of firms is necessary. More detailed explanation 
for the calculation of "Lnass" is shown in appendix one. 
The second control variable is a dummy variable "Founder". It is equals to one if the 
founder of a firm is still either a chairman, vice-chairman, managing director or an 
executive director in board. If this variable of a firm is one, it implies that the 
founder of this firm is still active in controlling the company. It is believed that a 
founder of a firm is willing to devote more time and energy in governing his firm. 
With his contribution, the firm can get a better performance more probably. Actually, 
Morck et al (1988) has already found an evidence for such belief. 
The next control variable is "History". It represents the age of a firm in 1996 that is 
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the year to be studied in this thesis. It is calculated by subtracting the number of the 
year in which a firm was established from 1996. Controlling the ages of firms is 
because return of an old firm may be very different from the one of a young firm. For 
example, young firms may need some time to settle down and deal with many 
problems in the beginning, which may affect their returns in the first few years. 
The five control variables left are all dummy variables. Each of them represents a 
sector a firm belongs to. "Prop", "Cong", "Bank", "Ind" and "Ut" refer to the sector 
of property and construction, the sector of conglomerates, the sector of bank and 
finance, industrial sector and the sector of utilities respectively. If a firm belongs to 
one of the sectors mentioned here, the dummy variable representing the sector is set 
as one and the other four are zero. If a firm does not belong to any one of the five 
sectors, all the five dummies are zero for this firm. It is not difficult to understand 
why the effects of the sectors firms belong to should be controlled. It is because 
people usually believe that each sector has its own particular nature and attributes 
that may affect the corporate performance. Hence, it is critical to control the effects 
coming from the sectors firms belong to. 
More explanation for the calculation and the sources of the information about the 
control variables are shown in appendix one. 
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Chapter 5 Sample Description 
According to Porta et al (1999)，Hong Kong comparatively has more family 
businesses than other economies. Moreover, people usually believe that the family 
businesses in Hong Kong perform quite well. Hence, this thesis tries to use Hong 
Kong as a case study to see if family businesses really perform better or not. 
Only listed firms involved 
Firms in the sample used are listed companies in Hong Kong stock market. The 
unlisted Hong Kong firms are excluded because there is a divergence between 
unlisted firms' strength and the listed firms' strength. It is not suitable to use them 
together in the comparison between corporate performance of family business and 
that one of non-family business. According to the listing rules set up by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK), a company which wants to be listed must 
have a trading record of not less than three financial years during which the profit to 
shareholders must not be less than HK$20,000,000. In addition, the expected market 
capitalization of the company at the time of listing must be at least HK$ 100,000,000. 
In other words, listed companies do have greater strength than unlisted ones. 
Among several hundreds of listed companies in Hong Kong stock market, the 33 
firms constituting the Hang Seng Index ( HSI ) and the 50 firms constituting the 
Hang Seng MidCap 50 Index ( HSMC50I) are chosen to be included in the sample. 
In fact, the 33 constituent stocks are representatives of the stock market in Hong 
Kong. It is because the aggregate market capitalization of these stocks accounts for 
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about 70% of the total market capitalization on the SEHK. According to the selection 
criteria, constituent stocks of the HSI are selected from stocks constituting the top 
90% of the total market capitalization and the top 90% of the total turnover of listed 
firms on the SEHK. That means these 33 firms are representing relatively large and 
strong companies in Hong Kong. Apart from involving the 33 large firms, the sample 
also includes 50 listed firms constituting HSMC50L Looking at the name of the 
index, it is easy to discern that these 50 firms are representatives of listed companies 
with medium capitalization on the SEHK. So far, both large and medium-sized 
traded firms in Hong Kong stock market are involved in this research. One thing 
should be mentioned is that the compositions of the HSI and HSMC50I are revised 
frequently basing on the selection criteria. The compositions of them used here were 
constructed in 1999. 
Using cross-sectional data in 199 6 
The research in this thesis focuses on the cross-sectional relationship between 
corporate performance and family businesses. Hence cross-sectional data of listed 
companies are used. It takes time to decide which year should be chosen to study. 
Finally, the year of 1996 is adopted in the investigation. This is the year just before 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Therefore, everything ran normally and the economical 
environment was with less noisiness. Firms had not yet been affected by 
unpredictable factors in the financial crisis and their performance could reveal their 
own real situation and strength. This is the reason why 1996 information of firms is 
chosen. 
There are totally 83 listed firms in HSI and HSMC50I. However, 13 of the firms 
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were set up after 1996, so they are not involved in the sample. Also, six out of 83 are 
excluded due to their incomplete information. Moreover, two firms whose shares are 
classified as "H share" are excluded. In total, only 62 out of the 83 listed companies 
are used in the sample. 
Sources of the information 
There are mainly three sources of the information used in this thesis. The first one is 
1996 annual report of every firm out of the 62 companies. Data of board ownership 
and biographical details of directors are all obtained from annual reports. The second 
source of the data is Tomson Financial Datastream. Information of R O E and annual 
total assets of firms are acquired from this datastream. The third source is the 
Wardley Cards (2000) which is issued by H S B C Broking (Data Services) Limited. 
Background information of firms and the classification of sector each firm belongs to 
are found from these Wardley Cards. 
Description of the sample 
-The 62 firms 
Table4 shows that among the 62 listed firms in the sample, 32 of them have related 
directors on their boards. That means over 50 percent of them can meet one criterion 
of being family businesses. However, some out of these 32 do not meet the second 
criterion, which means they do not have large family's shareholdings. When 
"FamlO" is used to define family business, 30 out of 62 firms are counted as family 
businesses. When "Fam20" is used, 28 out of 62 are regarded as family businesses. 
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When "Fam35" is used instead, only 24 family businesses are left. It can be seen that 
the amount of family businesses do not change very much as different family 
business indexes are used. However, no matter which family business index is used, 
at least over 38 percent of the Hong Kong listed firms in the sample are regarded as 
family businesses. This number is not small. 
-Sector classification 
In table3, the 62 firms are classified into six groups according to the sectors they 
belong to. Both sectors of property and conglomerates have 14 firms. There are nine 
firms belong to the sector of bank. Only four and three belong to the sectors of 
industry and utilities respectively. The left 19 firms are classified into the sector of 
other which includes IT., transportation, toys, food and hotels, etc. 
Table6 shows that about 79 percent of firms in the sector of property have related 
directors on boards. This sector has the largest number of firms meet the first 
criterion to be family businesses. There are about 67 percent, 56 percent, 42 percent, 
36 percent and 25 percent of the firms in the sectors of utilities, bank, other， 
conglomerates and industry have related directors respectively. 
When the second criterion met by family business is also considered, firms can be 
classified into family businesses or non-family businesses. Table6 shows the 
percentages of family businesses in other sectors. Under the definition of "FamlO", 
the sector of property has the most family businesses. About 79 percent of the firms 
in this sector are classified as family businesses. Actually, many large property and 
construction companies in Hong Kong are owned and controlled by families, such as 
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Li Ka Shing's family and Lee Shan Kee's family. The sector of bank has the smallest 
number of family businesses. Only about 21 percent of the firms in this sector are 
grouped as family businesses. When "Fam20" is used to define family business, the 
sector of property and the sector of bank still have the largest number and the 
smallest number of family businesses respectively. When “Fam35，，is used to define 
family business, the sector of bank, again, has the smallest number of family 
businesses. However, the percentage of family businesses in the sector of utilities is a 
little bit higher than the one in the sector of property this time. The percentage of 
family businesses in each sector can be found in table6. 
-Board ownership 
Table2 lists out all board shareholdings as well as families' shareholdings of the 62 
firms. As mentioned before, not all firms in the sample have family's shareholding 
since some of them are not owned by families. Yet, about two-third of large board 
ownership is due to large families' shareholdings. 
One thing should be noted that when board ownership is calculated, a complicated 
situation is encountered. Board ownership of a company is calculated by adding up 
all directors' shareholdings then over the total shares issued by the company. This 
information can be found in annual report where all directors' interests, which refer 
to their shareholdings in the company, are listed out. These directors' interests 
include directors' personal interests, directors' family interests, directors' corporate 
interests and directors' other interests. The complicated situation comes from the 
complexity of the corporate interests owned by directors. It is because some 
directors' corporate interests of the company are held through other companies. For 
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example, in Dao Heng Bank (DHB), director Quek Leng Chan and his two sons，who 
are also directors, together have a corporate interests that is the ownership of 
490,205,664 shares of DHB. However, they do not directly hold these 490,205,664 
shares. These shares are owned by another company called Guoco Group Limited 
(GCL) where Mr. Quek has ownership. Therefore, if people want to know how many 
percentages of the 490,205,664 shares are actually held by Mr. Quek and his family, 
people should firstly know how large the ownership of G C L Mr. Quek and his family 
has. However, the ownership information of G C L is not listed out in annual reports 
since it is not a listed company. Therefore, this thesis just simply treats the 
490,205,664 shares as the shareholding that are held by Mr. Quek and his sons. 
Because of this limitation, "Brdshare" of some firms may be overstated. It is an 
inevitable problem of computing a director's shareholding of a firm when he holds 
his shareholding through another firm that he only owns a part of it but the public 
does not know how large the part is. 
Tables shows how many firms among the 62 are in each range of the board 
ownership. Morck et al (1988) divides the board ownership into three groups. They 
are zero to five percent, five to 25 percent and over 25 percent. When such grouping 
is used, about 26 percent of the 62 firms are in the range of zero to five, eight percent 
of the 62 firms are in the range of five to 25 and 66 percent of the 62 firms are in the 
range over 25. That means over half of the firms in this sample have at least 25 
percent board ownership and they are mainly in the sector of other and the sector of 
property. When the range of the board ownership is grouped into zero to 35 percent, 
35 to 50 percent and over 50 percent, the percentages of the firms in the three ranges 
are about 44 percent, 10 percent and 47 percent respectively. That means there are 
about 50 percent of the firms in this sample with boards owning 50 or over 50 
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percent of shares. It reviews that Hong Kong firms have quite concentrated 
ownership. 
Table? shows how many firms in each sector are in different ranges of board 
ownership. It can be seen that the sector of other and the sector of property have 
larger numbers of firms with concentrated ownership. 
-Families ‘ shareholdings 
Besides board ownership, table2 also shows the families' shareholdings of the firms 
where there are related directors. Family's shareholding is calculated by adding up 
the percentages of shares held by all related directors on board. In order to ensure the 
shareholding held by a group of related directors or their family is really substantial, 
the information about the substantial shareholders of firms is checked too. Such 
information is also shown in annual reports at the request of the law. The name of 
every person or company holding 10 percent or more shareholding has to be 
disclosed and labeled as a substantial shareholder of a firm. The shareholding of such 
person or company has to be shown too. Usually if the total shareholding of all 
related directors is above 10 percent, their names and their family members' names 
or the names of other companies held by them will be shown as the substantial 
shareholders in annual report. However, there are two exceptional cases in the 
present observations. They are Hysan Development and New World Development. 
In Hysan Development, several members of Lees' family have seats in board. Their 
total shareholdings of the firm are only 4.41 percent. However, the substantial 
shareholder of Hysan Development is a company called Lee Hysan Estate Company 
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Limited that holds 40.3 percent of Hysan Development. After checking the 
information of Lee Hysan Estate in Company Registry, it can be known that those 
related directors in Lees' family of Hysan Development are also directors and 
owners of Lee Hysan Estate Company Limited. Therefore, the substantial 
shareholder of Hysan Development is actually Lees' family and the 40.3 percent is 
used to represent the shareholdings of Lees' family in Hysan Development instead of 
using 4.41 percent. 
Similarly, in New World Development, several members of Chengs' family have 
seats in board. Their total shareholdings are only 8.42 percent. However, the 
substantial shareholder of New World Development is Chow Tai Fook Enterprise 
Limited that holds 38.55 percent of New World Development. After checking the 
information of Chow Tai Fook in Company Registry, it is known that Chengs' family 
is the main owner and controller of Chow Tai Fook Enterprise Limited. Thus, the 
38.55 percent is used to represent the shareholdings of Chengs' family in New World 
Development instead of using 8.42 percent. As a result, not surprisingly, the families' 
shareholdings are even larger than the board ownership in these two firms. 
For more information about the family businesses in this sample, tableS shows the 
names of the families who own the companies and the relationship among the 
directors in the companies which meet the two criteria to be family businesses. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Result and Implication 
Based on the methods mentioned in chapter four and the sample including Hong 
Kong listed companies, the empirical results are found as follow. The results of the 
data analysis are presented first. After that, the outcomes of the regression models are 
shown. 
6.1 Results of Data Analysis 
In this section, all the 62 observations are classed into different groups. Then the 
average R O E of each group is calculated and some comparisons can be carried out to 
see if family businesses meeting the two criteria have better average performance or 
not. On the whole, the highest R O E and the lowest R O E of the 62 firms are 75.3 
percent and —120.94 percent respectively with the mean of 11.22 percent. 
Family businesses having higher average ROE 
Since there are three percentages of families' shareholdings used for defining the 
family businesses, there are three groups of comparisons between the average R O E 
of family businesses and the one of non-family businesses. In more precise language, 
each of the three groups of comparison takes the dummy variables "FamlO", 
"Fam20" and "Fam35" as an index to classify family businesses from other firms 
separately. 
TablelO.3 shows that in the group where "FamlO" is used to distinguish family 
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businesses from non-family businesses, 30 out of the 62 observations belong to 
family business. Their average R O E is 14.69 percent that is double the one，7.96 
percent, for non-family businesses. It means that firms with related directors who 
together have 10 percent or more shareholdings can perform better. The t-statistic for 
the difference in mean is 6.11. If a 95 percent confidence interval is used, the 
hypothesis of having same mean of R O E by family businesses and non-family 
businesses can be rejected. 
In the group where "Fam20" is used, 28 out of the 62 observations are classified as 
family businesses. Their average R O E is 14.47 percent. The average R O E of 
non-family businesses is just 8.54 percent. The result is similar to the one of using 
“FamlO”. It is because only two firms are shifted from the category of family 
businesses to non-family businesses when "Fam20" replaces “FamlO，，in use. The 
t-statistic for the difference in mean is 5.41 in this case. If 5 percent error is allowed, 
the hypothesis of having same mean of R O E by family businesses and non-family 
businesses can be rejected. 
When "Fam35" is employed in the classification, 24 firms are grouped as family 
businesses. Their average R O E is 13.08 percent that is a little higher than the one of 
non-family businesses, 10.04 percent. The t-statistic is 3.06 in this case. Again, the 
hypothesis of having same mean of R O E by family businesses and non-family 
businesses can be rejected. 
No matter which family business index is used to classify family businesses, the 
average R O E of family businesses is higher than the one of non-family businesses. 
All the results are also shown in tablelO.3. It seems that family businesses do have 
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better performance on average. However, merely these results cannot prove that the 
higher average R O E is mainly due to the effects of being family businesses since 
there may be other uncontrolled factors contributing to the better performance. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the regression results to see if family businesses 
meeting the two criteria can give positive effects on corporate performance or not. 
The group with "family relationship，，having higher average ROE 
TablelO.l shows that there are totally 32 firms in the sample with one for the dummy 
variable "Famrela". It means that at least two directors in each of these 32 firms are 
relatives. Their average R O E is 14.9 percent that is higher than the average ROE, 
7.29 percent, of the group where the firms have no related directors. It seems that 
when there is family relationship among directors, the firms can have better 
performance on average. 
The group with concentrated ownership having higher average ROE 
In order to see if firms with more concentrated ownership perform better or not，the 
62 firms are firstly grouped according to "Brdshare", their board ownership. There 
are two sets of cutoff points for the grouping. The first set is five percent and 25 
percent; the second set is 35 percent and 50 percent. The former set is suggested by 
Morck et al (1988) and the later one is proposed in this thesis. Using 35 percent as 
the first breakpoint is because the SEHK views this shareholding percentage as the 
least amount of shares a controlling shareholder should own. In other words, it is 
common to believe that once a shareholder has 35 percent of a corporate ownership, 
he has the right to control the firm's strategic direction and monitor the management. 
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The second breakpoint is set at 50 percent. It is because when a person has 50 
percent or more of a corporate ownership, he automatically has a controlling power 
over all decisions of a firm since in almost every voting game among board directors, 
this shareholder can win without doubt. 
By using the first set of cutoff points, the firms with more concentrated ownership do 
have better performance on average. The results are shown in tablelO.2. The average 
R O E of the firms with zero to five percent ownership concentration is 1.51 percent, e 
average R O E of the firms with five to 25 percent ownership concentration is 14.64 
percent and the one for firms with over 25 percent ownership concentration is 14.59 
percent. The first average ROE is much lower than the last two. That means the 
variation between the performance of firms with very dispersed ownership and the 
one of firms with more concentrated ownership is quite large. However, The last 
average R O E is not the highest but even a bit lower than the second one. It shows 
that the average performance of the firms with very concentrated ownership do not 
perform best. All these may imply that the effect of concentrated ownership is 
positive essentially but it becomes negative if the degree of concentration is too high. 
In other words, directors work harder if their wealth depends on firms more, but if 
they have more and more control of firms, they do have more power or chance to 
expropriate corporate resources. Thus, if firms have too concentrated ownership, the 
performance may be deteriorated. It is not always true that increasing ownership 
concentration is good for a firm. 
The results and implication are similar to the above one if the second set of cutoff 
points of grouping is used. The results can be found in tablelO.2. The average ROE 
of the firms with zero to 35 percent ownership concentration is 3.56 percent, the 
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average R O E of the firms with 35 to 50 percent ownership concentration is 17.36 
percent and the one for firms with over 50 percent ownership concentration is 17.08 
percent. 
Parenthetically, besides the above grouping, the 62 firms are also classified into 
different groups according to the control variables. The average R O E of each group 
is shown in tablelO.4 tolO.6. Surprisingly, 12 firms in which founders are still active 
in controlling firms have much higher average R O E than those without active 
founders do. Thus, maybe the existence of active founder can really help a firm to 
have better performance. 
6.2 Results of the Regression Models 
In regression, more reliable effects of being family businesses on corporate 
performance can be found out by controlling those of other factors. The results of the 
regression models in the thesis are presented as the follow. 
Effect of being family businesses on corporate performance 
For the regression model where three family business indexes “FamlO，,，'Tam20" 
and “Fam35，，are used to see if family businesses can have higher R O E or not, the 
results are found as below. 
When "FamlO" is used, the result is 
ROE = -48.5 + 7.2372 FamlO + control variables 
(LI806) 
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where the number in parenthesis is a T-ratio of the corresponding coefficient. This 
result shows that the coefficient of "FamlO" is positive and statistically significant at 
0.243 level. When the definition of family business is based on “FamlO，，，the effect 
of being a family business on corporate performance is positive, yet the statistically 
significant level is not very high." The entire result of this regression is shown in 
table 11.1. Besides, the correlation among the independent variables in the regression 
model is checked. The result is shown in Tablel2.1. In fact, no two of the 
independent variables are significantly correlated with each other. None of the 
independent variables is redundant. 
When "Fam20" is used, the result is 
ROE = - 47.26 + 5.3221 FamlO + control variables 
(0.8678) 
It can be seen that the coefficient of "Fam20" is smaller than the one of "FamlO" 
with even lower statistically significant level. It means that when the definition of 
family business is based on "Fam20", the positive effect of being a family business 
on corporate performance is smaller and less credible. The entire regression result is 
shown in table 11.2.The correlation of the independent variables is shown in 
table 12.2. Again, no two of the independent variables are significantly correlated 
with each other. 
When "Fam35", the strongest family business index among three, is used, the 
regression result is 
ROE = - 49.82 + 5.3839 Fam35 + control variables 
(0.8526) 
The coefficient of "Fam35" is similar to the one of "Fam20" and also statistically 
66 
insignificant. The entire regression result is shown in table 11.3. The correlation of 
the independent variables is shown in tablel2.3. No two of the independent variables 
are significantly correlated with each other. 
In brief, the effect of being a family business, which meets the two criteria suggested 
in this thesis, on corporate performance is positive. However, when the lowest 
requirement of ownership concentration in defining family business is increased 
from ten to 20 or 35 percent, the credibility of the positive effect is undermined. 
With the insignificant results shown above, a new dummy variable is used in trial in 
the model. The variable called "Mandir" which stands for managing directors. It is 
equal to one when one of the related directors in family business is a managing 
director on board. It is equal to zero if the managing director is not a member of the 
family who holds a substantial proportion of shares in the company. In this case, the 
controlling family did bring in outside talent into the management team. To see the 
effect of outside talent on corporate performance, a regression of R O E on “Mandir’， 
plus control variables was carried out and the results are shown as below: 
ROE = - 46.0776 + 4.2507Mandir + control variables 
(0.6105) 
The coefficient of "Mandir" is not statistically significant. That means the results do 
not support the hypothesis that the family relationship of the managing director with 
the controlling family has an impact on corporate performance. The entire regression 
result is shown in table 11.4. 
Additionally, the results of regression models with both “Mandir” and family 
business index can be found in tablell.5 to tablell.7. Actually, the coefficients of all 
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family business indexes, "FamlO", “Fam20，，and "Fam35", are still not very 
statistically significant and the coefficient of "Mandir" is even less insignificant than 
before. The correlation among independent variables in these three regression models 
is shown in tablel2.4 to tablel2.7. 
Effects of family relationship and concentrated ownership on performance 
When the effects of the family relationship and the ownership concentration on 
corporate performance are studied in the regression model, the result is found as 
follow: 
Firstly, when only "Famrela" is used as the key variable in the regression, the result 
is 
ROE = - 46.41 + 6.5232 Famrela + control variables 
(1.0765) 
where the number in parenthesis is T-ratio for the coefficient of "Famrela". It can be 
seen the effect of family relationship on corporate performance is positive but only 
statistically significant at 0.29 level. The entire regression result can be found in table 
11.8. 
Since the result shows that the effect of having family relationship among directors 
on corporate performance is not statistically significant, the dummy variable 
"Famrela" is modified a little bit. A modified variable is "Imfam" which stands for 
immediate family relationship. This variable is one when the related directors have 
father/mother-and-son/daughter or husband-and-wife relationship only. It is believed 
that benefit is transferred more commonly among immediate family. Therefore, 
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maybe such relationship can especially induce family members to put more effort to 
monitor a firm. The result of the regression with "Imfam" is shown as below: 
ROE = - 45.2771 + 0.059564 Imfam + control variables 
(0.0085447) 
However, the effect of having immediate family on corporate performance is even 
more statistically insignificant. No conclusion about the influence of family 
relationship on performance can be made. The entire regression result is shown in 
tablell.9. 
When only "Brdshare" is entered as the key independent variable, the result is 
ROE 二 - 59.56 + 0.2126Brdshare + control variables 
(1.7659) 
It shows that when the board ownership increases one percent, the R O E will increase 
0.21 percent. That means the effect of concentrated ownership on corporate 
performance is positive. The statistically significant level of this effect is higher than 
the one of "Famrela". The entire regression result is shown in table 11.10. 
If the two key independent variables, "Famrela" and "Brdshare" are considered at the 
same time in the regression, the result becomes 
ROE = - 58.55 + 2.6689 Famrela + 0.1905 Brdshare + control variables 
(0.4059) (1.432) 
This result shows that when the two independent variables are involved in the 
regression at the same time，their coefficients are still positive but statistically 
significant level will be lowered, especially the one for "Famrela". The entire 
regression result can be found in table 11.11. The correlation among the independent 
variables can be found in tablel2.8. Neither one of the independent variables is very 
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correlated to the other ones. 
When "Imfam" is used instead of "Famrela", the result is: 
ROE = -58.5444 - 2.2454 Imfam + 0.22003 Brdshare + control variables 
(-0.32301) (1.7801) 
In this case, the effect of having immediate family is even negative. However, with 
such low statistically significant level, this negativity is meaningless. On the contrary, 
the effect of concentrated ownership is more significant. The entire regression result 
can be found in tablell.l2. The correlation of the independent variables are shown in 
tablel2.9. Neither one of the independent variables is very correlated to the other 
ones. 
All the above results show that the effect of family relationship is statistically 
insignificant. That means they cannot support the hypothesis that family 
relationship among directors has effects on corporate performance. It means that 
family business do not get any advantageous or disadvantageous effect by having 
related directors. Yet, it is more plausible that increasing the degree of ownership 
concentration can help a firm to have better performance since the statistically 
significant level of the positive coefficient of "Brdshare" is higher. That means it is 
more possible that family businesses having more concentrated ownership can get 
better performance due to such reason. 
To have a supplement, the effects of board ownership is also investigated by using 
the method suggested by Morck et al (1988), that is using the piecewise linear 
regression models. All the results can be found in appendix two. 
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Summary 
In sum, when family business indexes are used in the regression model, the results 
are not statistically significant. That is to say the positive effect of being a family 
business, which meets the two criteria, on corporate performance is not very credible. 
Consequently, the answer found here for the question “do family businesses perform 
better?" is "uncertain". 
In addition, the regression result suggests that the family relationship among 
directors does not impose much impact on corporate performance, either positive or 
negative one. Hence, there is no evidence that family businesses can have better or 
worse performance comparing with other firms due to the existence of family 
relationship among directors who monitor the firms. On the contrary, it is more 
credible that the concentrated ownership can affect the corporate performance. The 
regression result implies that increasing ownership concentration can improve the 
corporate performance. Accordingly, family businesses should have better 
performance by virtue of their highly concentrated ownership. 
With the above conclusion, the first part of the hypothesis about the family 
relationship cannot be verified, whereas the second part about concentrated 
ownership is more valid. Thus, being one type of firms having concentrated 
ownership, family businesses probably can have better performance, but they cannot 
get benefit from being controlled by related directors. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis investigates if family businesses, which meet the two criteria, can have 
better performance or not. Finally, the results cannot show family businesses perform 
better than other firms do. 
The empirical research finds that having concentrated ownership tends to give 
positive effect on corporate performance. It supports the hypothesis that large 
shareholders are willing to work harder due to the impact of their convergence of 
interests. Family businesses with concentrated ownership can benefit from it. 
However, the empirical results cannot provide evidence for the existence of the effect 
of family relationship among directors. That means the results show that the presence 
of related directors in family businesses gives neither positive nor negative effect on 
corporate performance - at least on ROE. Possibly, human thought and behavior are 
so complex that cannot be deduced from a simple hypothesis. Even in the same 
family, members may have different attitudes and reactions towards relatives' 
benefits in their family businesses. Some may treat relatives' benefits as credits, 
some may treat them as debits and some may just ignore them. Moreover, the effects 
of husband-wife relationship, father-son relationship, sibling relationship and relative 
relationship by marriage may be totally different. Therefore, simply using a variable 
in regression cannot prove the hypothesis about directors' altitude towards their 
related directors' income. It is a weakness of the regression models set up in this 
thesis. 
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Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to conclude that the performance of family 
businesses has no difference with the one of non-family businesses by just basing on 
this research. It is because this thesis just focuses at two criteria met by family 
businesses. There may be some other criteria that can greatly affect family 
businesses' performance not yet considered here. If more criteria met by family 
businesses can be included in the empirical research, it can give a more 
comprehensive investigation into the effects of being a family business on corporate 
performance. Moreover, R O E is only one type of performance indicators. There may 
be more proper financial variables able to indicate corporate performance than ROE. 
Using other proper indicators may possibly help to get more significant results. 
Furthermore, this thesis just chooses one year to be studied, but if panels of data 
covering several years are used, this may help to reveal the actual situation more 
exactly. Perhaps, family businesses can have better performance only under certain 
circumstances. If it is true, finding out such circumstances is probably another focus 
in the further study of family businesses’ performance. 
Although, the results of this thesis are not strong enough to make a clear and 
inspiring conclusion, it can be viewed as a supplementary research to the study of 
family business. As mentioned before, scholars studying family business seldom 
investigate empirically how different the family businesses' performance is from 
other firms'. Also, this thesis tries to use a new approach for studying family 
business instead of using case analyses and questionnaires that are usually employed 
by previous scholars. Undoubtedly, the question of whether family businesses 
perform better or not is still researchable. Further study on this really can help us to 
understand more about family business that does exist commonly in our business 
world. 
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1 The idea here is just similar to but not the same with "Rotten Kid Theorem". They 
are similar in the sense that both claim that family members are willing to 
internalize the externalities of his action to other members. However, “Rotten Kid 
Theorem" assumes that there is at least one real altruist in a family, but this 
assumption is not necessary in this thesis to develop our simple idea. 
n Among the 62 firms, the board ownership information of two firms does not match 
with the commonly known information shown by mass media or other sources. The 
two firms are Sino Land and Wharf Holding. Therefore, the regression model with 
"FamlO" was carried out after eliminating these two observations. And the results 
are just similar to the one including the two firms. The regression results can be 
found in table 11.17. 
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Appendix 1. Definition and Calculation of the Variables 
The definitions and the calculations of the variables are in more detail here. 
ROE 
R O E stands for "returns on equity". It is acquired from Tomson Financial Datastream. 
The equation of R O E for Hong Kong companies is “(Earned for ordinary / Equity 
capital & reserves) * 100" where earned for ordinary is the 1996 profit used to 
calculate earnings per share. The profit is the net profit arrived at after deducting tax, 
minority interest, pre-acquisition profits and preference dividends attributable to 
ordinary shareholders, and where equity capital and reserves are 1996 total 
shareholders' equity less any preference capital. A high R O E represents a better 
corporate performance. 
However, there is a problem of using the ROE described as above. The problem is 
caused by the difference between a "flow concept" and a "stock concept". Return of a 
firm in 1996 is a variable with a "flow concept". It is calculated by accumulating the 
day-to-day net profit of a firm. In contrast, equity of a firm in 1996 is a variable with 
a "stock concept". It is reported in dollar value on the day when financial data of a 
firm are recorded and prepared for an annual announcement. So the data of annual 
equity reported are just one-day information, but not the average one of the whole 
year. In order to use a more fitting and representative ROE in 1996, the average 
equity of two successive years instead of only the equity in 1996 is used. That is to 
say，ROE in this paper is calculated by “(Earned for ordinary in 1996 / average 
capital and reserves between 1995 and 1996) * 100". 
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Brdshare 
"Brdshare" is a percentage of shares held by all board members of a firm. The 
information of board members is abstracted from 1996 annual reports of the 62 firms. 
All directors' interests of a firm where they have seats in board are shown in an 
annual report. These directors' interests include directors' personal interests, 
directors' family interests, directors' corporate interests and directors' other interests. 
All of the interests are actually the numbers of shares held by the directors 
themselves, by their family or by other corporations where the directors have 
interests. 
Note that when "Brdshare" is calculated, a complicated situation is encountered. This 
situation comes from the complexity of the corporate interests owned by directors. It 
is because some directors' corporate interests of a firm are held through other 
companies. For example, in Dao Heng Bank (DHB), director Quek Leng Chan and 
his two sons, who are also directors, together have a corporate interests that is the 
ownership of 490205664 shares of DHB. However, they do not directly hold these 
490205664 shares. These shares are owned by another company called Guoco Group 
Limited (GCL) where Mr. Quek has ownership. Therefore，if we want to know how 
many percentages of the 490205664 shares are actually held by Mr. Quek and his 
family, we should firstly know how large the ownership of G C L Mr. Quek and his 
family has. However, the ownership information of G C L is not listed out in annual 
reports since it is not a listed company. Therefore, we just simply treat the 
490205664 shares as the shareholding that are held by Mr. Quek and his sons. 
Because of this limitation, "Brdshare" of some firms may be overstated. It is an 
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inevitable problem of computing a director's interests of a firm when he holds his 
interests through another firm that he only owns a part of it but the public does not 
know how large the part is. 
Famrela 
"Famrela" is a dummy variable which is used to distinguish the firms where some of 
the directors are related from those where all directors are not related. This variable 
is equal to one if two or more directors are relatives and it is zero if all directors are 
not related in a firm. The annual reports of the 62 firms have been checked up to 
collect this information. 
Fam35 
"Fam35" is a dummy variable called family business index. It is used to indicate if a 
firm is a family business. It is equal to one if there are two or more related directors 
who together have 35 percent or more shareholdings in a firm. In order to figure out 
the value of this dummy variable for each firm, the family relationship among all 
directors in every firm is checked out first. This information can be found in annual 
reports of listed companies. Once it is known that some of the directors in a firm are 
relatives, two things are figured out next. One is the total shareholdings of all related 
directors. Since every director's shareholding of the company has to be listed out, 
including his personal shareholding, his family's shareholding and his shareholding 
held through other corporations, it is not difficult to find out the total shareholdings 
of all related directors. For each firm，these total shareholdings of all related directors 
usually represent its family's shareholding. Hence, if the total shareholdings of all 
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related directors in a firm is above 35 percent, it means that the shareholding held by 
their family is also over 35 percent. Then, "Fam35" of this firm is one. 
In order to ensure the shareholding held by a group of related directors or their 
family in a company is really substantial, the information about the substantial 
shareholders of the company is checked too. This is the other thing we have to look 
at after finding out there are related directors in a firm. Such information is shown in 
annual reports too. The name of every person or company holding ten percent or 
more shareholding has to be disclosed and labeled as a substantial shareholder of a 
firm. The shareholding of this person or company has to be shown too. Usually if the 
total shareholding of all related directors in a company is above ten percent, their 
names and their family members' names or the names of their other companies will 
be announced as substantial shareholders of the company in annual report. Their 
shareholdings are listed out there too. Therefore, we can confirm if a family really 
holds large shareholding of a firm by looking at the information of the substantial 
shareholders. 
However, there are two exceptional cases in our observations. They are Hysan 
Development and New World Development. In Hysan Development, several 
members of Lees' family have seats in board. Their total shareholdings of the firm 
are only 4.41 percent. However, the substantial shareholder of Hysan Development is 
a company called Lee Hysan Estate Company Limited that holds 40.3 percent of 
Hysan Development. After checking, we know that those related directors in Lees' 
family of Hysan Development are also directors and owners of Lee Hysan Estate 
Company Limited. Therefore, the substantial shareholder of Hysan Development is 
actually Lees' family. We use 40.3 percent to represent the shareholdings of Lees' 
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family in Hysan Development instead of using 4.41 percent. 
Similarly, in New World Development, several members of Chengs' family have 
i 
seats in board. Their total shareholdings are only 8.42 percent. However, the 
substantial shareholder of New World Development is Chow Tai Fook Enterprise 
Limited that holds 38.55 percent of New World Development. After checking, we 
know that Chengs' family is the main owner and controller of Chow Tai Fook 
• Enterprise Limited. Thus, we use 38.55 percent to represent the shareholdings of 
Chengs' family in New World Development instead of using 8.42 percent. 
Fam20 
"Fam20" is also a family business index. It is equal to one if there are two or more 
related directors who together have 20 percent or more shareholdings in a firm. The 
process of figuring out the value of this dummy variable for each firm is exactly the 
same with the one of "Fam35". 
FamlO 
"FamlO" is another family business index. It is equal to one if there are two or more 
related directors who together have 10 percent or more shareholdings in a firm. The 
process of figuring out the value of this dummy variable for each firm is exactly the 
same with the one of "Fam35". 
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Lnass 
"Lnass" is the logarithm of total assets of a firm in 1996. It is used to capture the 
effects of firm size on corporate performance. The information of total assets of each 
firm is extracted from Tomson Financial Datastream. 
Founder 
"Founder" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the founder of a firm is still 
either a chairman, a vice chairman, a managing director or an executive director in a 
board. This information can be found out in Wardley Cards and annual reports. 
History 
It is calculated by “1996 - the establishment year of a firm" where the establishment 
date can be found at Wardley Cards which list out all important events of each firm 
with ascendant order of time. 
Prop 
"Prop" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector of 
property and construction. There are totally 14 among the 62 firms classified into this 
sector according to Wardley Cards. 
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Cong 
"Cong" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector of 
conglomerates. There are totally 14 among the 62 firms classified into this sector by 
Wardley Cards. 
Bank 
"Bank" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector of 
bank and finance. There are totally nine among the 62 firms classified into this sector 
according to Wardley Cards. 
Ind 
"Ind" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector of 
industry. There are totally four among the 62 firms classified into this sector 
according to Wardley Cards. 
Ut 
"Ut" is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector of 
utilities including the provision of electricity, gas and water. There are totally three 
among the 62 firms classified into this sector according to Wardley Cards. 
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Appendix two: Piecewise linear regression model suggested by Morck et al 
(1988) 
Piecewise linear regression model 
In Morck et al (1988), it claims that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate performance is not completely linear, but it should be 
different in different ranges of ownership concentration in a firm. After that, many 
scholars follow their method to investigate the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate performance. Hence, the "piecewise" idea of Morck et al 
is used here for a trial to capture the effect of ownership concentration. The 
regression model is set as: 
R O E = a + ^ i Famrela +/52 BrdOtoS +/53 Brd5to25 + (3a Brdover25 + control 
variables 
where "Famrela" is still used to capture the effect of the family relationship among 
directors on corporate performance. The other three variables "Brd0to5", "Brd5to25" 
and "Brdover25" created by Morck et al are used to capture the effect of ownership 
concentration in three different ranges of concentration on corporate performance. 
The three variables are calculated as follow: 
BrdOtoS = board shareholding if board shareholding < 5% 
= 5 % if board shareholding ^  5% 
Brd5to25 二 0% if board shareholding < 5% 
=board shareholding minus 5% if 5%Aboard shareholding< 25% 
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= 2 0 % if board shareholding ^ 2 5 % 
Brdover25 二 0% if board shareholding < 25% 
二 board shareholding minus 25% if board shareholding ^  25% 
Based on these three variables, the slopes of the piecewise linear regression are 
allowed to change at 5 percent and 25 percent. Actually, there is no tight rule of 
determining the turning points. Hence, the other set of turning points is used in this 
regression besides the one suggested by Morck et al. The two turning points are 35 
percent and 50 percent. 
Using 35 percent as the first breakpoint is because the SEHK views this shareholding 
percentage as the least amount of shares a controlling shareholder should own. In 
other words, it is common to believe that once a shareholder has 35 percent of a 
corporate ownership, he has the right to control the firm's strategic direction and 
monitor the management. The second breakpoint is set at 50 percent. It is because 
when a person has 50 percent or more of a corporate ownership, he automatically has 
a controlling power over all decisions of a firm since in almost every voting game 
among board directors, this shareholder can win without doubt. Accordingly, the 
three variables capturing the effect of ownership concentration at different ranges are 
"BrdOto35", "Brd35to50" and "BrdoverSO". The are calculated as the follow: 
BrdOto35 = board shareholding if board shareholding < 35% 
二 35% if board shareholding^ 35% 
Brd35to50 = 0% if board shareholding <35% 
=board shareholding minus 35% if 35%Aboard shareholding < 50% 
=15% if board shareholding^ 50% 
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Brdover50 = 0% if board shareholding < 50% 
=board shareholding minus 50% if board shareholding ^  50% 
In this piecewise linear regression, if the coefficient of "Famrela" is still positive 
(negative) with high statistically significant level, it proves that the family 
relationship among directors can really affect corporate performance positively 
(negatively) even the effect of concentrated ownership is considered in the way 
suggested by Morck et al (1988). Moreover, the coefficients of “BrdOto5，，， 
"Brd5to25" and “Brdover25” can show the effects of ownership concentration in the 
ranges of zero to five percent, five to 25 percent and over 25 percent of ownership 
concentration respectively. Likewise, the coefficients of "BrdOto35", "Brd35to50" 
and "BrdoverSO" represents the effects of ownership concentration in the ranges of 
zero to 35 percent, 35 to 50 percent and over 50 percent of ownership concentration 
respectively. If they are all statistically significant, it can prove that ownership 
concentration really affect corporate performance in different ranges. And if their 
signs are different, which means that different ranges of ownership concentration do 
have different effects on corporate performance. The results of these piecewise linear 
regressions will be shown in chapter six. 
Results of the piecewise linear regression model 
Before capturing the effect of family relationship as well，it is better to take a look at 
the results of the piecewise linear regression without "Famrela". Using the turning 
points suggested by Morck et al, the result is found as follow: 
ROE = - 60.47 + 5.4697 BrdOtoS - 1.064 Brd5to25 + 0.2666 Brdover25 
(1.5422) (-1.1436) (1.0796) 
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+ control variables 
The entire regression result is shown in table 11.13. Notably, the signs of the 
coefficients of all the three independent variables are coincident with those found by 
Morck et al in their research. The result suggests that for each one- percent increase 
in ownership between zero to five percent, R O E rises by about five percent. For each 
one-percent increase in ownership from five to 25 percent, R O E declines about one 
percent. As ownership rises beyond 25 percent, R O E rises, but at the slower rate of 
about 0.3 percent for each one percent increase in ownership. Most of the 
family-owned firms in the sample have very concentrated ownership, it implies that 
the marginal effect of further increasing their ownership concentration is still positive 
but very small. However, how do the effects vary within the upper part of the 
concentration? Hence, the second set of turning points proposed in the thesis is used 
in trial. 
The set of turning points proposed in this thesis is 35 percent and 50 percent. The 
reason of choosing them has been explained before. When they are used, the 
regression result is found as follow: 
ROE = -59.41 + 0.1022Brd0to35 + 0.8678Brd35to50 - 0.1915 BrdoverSO 
(0.3132) (1.09) (-0.4004) 
+ control variables 
In this result, the coefficients of the three variables, especially the first and the third 
one，are statistically insignificant. Hence, not many conclusions can be given based 
on the result. However, it still shows a trend that an additional increase in ownership 
concentration in the more concentrated ranges, which are above 50 percent of 
shareholding, may possibly worsen the corporate performance. If it is true, family 
businesses, which have already got the very concentrated ownership, should not 
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further increase their ownership of the firms. The entire regression result is shown in 
tablell.14. 
N o w "Famrela" is added into the piecewise linear regression to see the effect of 
family relationship on corporate performance when the effects of ownership 
concentration is considered in the way suggested by Morck et al (1988). The 
regression results are found as follow: 
ROE =-59.44 +1.627IFamrela +5.3186Brd0to5 -L0739Brd5to25+0.2649Brdover25 
(0.2386) (1.4627) (-1.1422) (1.062) 
+ control variables 
ROE =-58+2.3128Famrela +0.0612Brd0to35+0.8629Brd35to50- 0.1821Brdover25 
(0.3356) (0.1767) (1.0729) (-0.3768) 
+ control variables 
The entire results of these two regressions are shown in tablelLlS and 11.16. The 
coefficient of "Famrela" is very statistically insignificant with using either set of 
turning points for ownership concentration. That means the existence of the effect of 
family relationship cannot be proved here. 
According to the above results, it seems that the effect of ownership concentration on 
corporate performance is more credible than the one of family relationship. 
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Appendix Three: Tables 
Table 1 Definitions of variables 
R O E -Returns on equity 
"(corporate returns in 1996/the average of firms' total assets between 
1995 and 1996) *100 
Famrela -a dummy variable which equals one if two or more directors are 
relatives and equals zero if otherwise  
Brdshare -a shareholding percentage of all board members in a 
firm  
Fam35 -family business index 
-a dummy variable which is equal to one if there are two or more 
related directors who together have 35 percent or more of the 
shareholding in a firm  
Fam20 -family business index 
-a dummy variable which is equal to one if there are two or more 
related directors who together have 20 percent or more of the 
shareholding in a firm  
Fam 10 -family business index 
-a dummy variable which is equal to one there are two or more 
related directors who together have 10 percent or more of the 
shareholding in a firm  
Lnass -the logarithm of total assets of a firm in 1996 
Founder -a dummy variable which is equal to one if the founder of a firm is 
still either a chairman, a vice chairman, a managing director or an 
executive director in a board  
History -a number calculated by (1996 - the establishment year of a firm) 
Prop -a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the 
sector of property and construction 
Cong -a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to the sector 
of conglomerates  
Bank -a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the 
sector of bank and finance  
Ind -a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the 
sector of industry  
Ut -a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm belongs to the  
sector of utilities  
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Table 2 Information of "Brdshare", ‘‘Famshare,，and 
Family Business Indexes of 62 firms 
Name Brdshare Famshare Famrela FamlO |Fam2Q |Fam35 ~ 
Allied Group 24.79一 - Q “ Q ~ 0 " o ” 
Amoy Properties 58.59 - Q 一~0 0 0 
Asia Tele-Net & 48.29 “ 0 0 0 0 
Tech.  
A S M Pacific Tech. 50.96 ~ - 0 0 0 0 
Bank Of East Asia 9.52 — 2.45 “ 1 Q 一 ~ 0 0 
Cathay Pacific Q.QQ - ~ 0 0 0 0 
Century City 63.63 一 - Q ~ 0 0 
Cheung Kong Hdg. 33.84一 33.78 1 1 i Q 
Cheung Kong Infr. 86.58 “ 0 0 0 0 
China Everbright Intl. Q.QQ I Q 0 0 0 
China Internet Global 40.70 - 0 0 0 Q 
China Pharmaceutical 7.17 „ Q 0 0 0 
China Res.Entrep. Q.QQ I Q 0 0 0 
China Star 1 1 i j ~ 
Entertainment  
CITIC Pacific — 27.37 " T s ^ ^ 1 _ 1 q 
CLP Holdings L M ~ ~ 33.29 ~ 33.27 1 1 i q“ 
Dao Heng Bank Gp. 71.80 71.79 ~ 1 1 i i 
Denway Motors Ltd. 0.00 “ Q 0 0 0 
Dickson Concepts 55.56 - 0 0 0 0 
E-Kong Group Ltd. 0.04 “ 0 0 0 0 
Esun Hdg. Ltd. 61.52 ~ 61.52 1 1 J J 
First Pacific 56.52 一54.32 1 — 1 i i 
FPBBank — 1 . 4 5 _ J _ _ _ _ _ 0 _ 0 0 0 
Hang Lung Dev. 52.22— 35.71 1 — 1 1 J 
Hang Seng Bank Q.86 0.72 1 0 0 0 
Henderson Inv. 70.55 70.28 1 1 i J 
Henderson Ld.Dev. 68.40 68.24 一 1 1 J f 
Hinet Holdings Ltd. 61.00 60.92 一 1 J j J 
Hmg Kong Holdings 34.22 34.22 — 1 1 i J 
HK.& China Gas 13.38 - — 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 34.63 U m 1 1 0 0 
Construction 、 
Hong Kong Electnc 51.66 34.63 ~ 1 1 J q 
HSBC Hdg. 一 0.96 “ 0 Q 0 0 
Hutchison Whamp. 46.07 45.64 1 i J 5 
Hysan Dev. 3.26 [ 40.25 1 1 i J 
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ICG Asiaworks Ltd. 38.22 37.84 | 1 | 1 | 1 丨 1 
IDT Intl. 62.86 62.3 — 1 1 “ 1 1 
Intl.Bank Of Asia 0.00 - — 0 “ 0 Q Q 
JCG Holdings 54.78— - 0 0 0 0 
Johnson Electric Hdg. 59.87 59.64 1 1 ~ ~ 1 1 
Lai Sun Dev. 56.49— 56.39 1 1 ""“ 1 1 
Legend Holdings 26.55 - — 0 0 ~ 0 0 
Li&Fung 58.30 58.03 1 1 一 1 1 
Lippo China Res. 7 2 . 6 ~ 72.6 1 1 1 1 
Liu Chong Hing ^ 1 1 1 1 
Bank  
Mingly 65.58 65.58 — 1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 
Moulin Intl. 60.56— 60.56 1 1 1 — 1 
New World Dev. 0.57 38.55 1 1 1 1 
Oriental Union Hdg. 71.06 -- — 0 0 0 — 0 
Regal Hotels “ 0 0 0 0 
Intl.Hdg.  
Sino Land 0.31 ~ ~ - " 0 0 Q “ 0 
Sun Hung Kai Props. 46.58 46.32 1 1 1 1 
Swire Pacific 'A' 0.15 - — 0 0 0 — 0 
Tian An China Invs. 0.07 - 0 0 0 0 — 
Tingyi 68.16 ^ 1 1 1 1 
Cymn.Isle.Hdg.  
Top Glory “ 0 ~~0 0 0 
International  
TV.Broadcasts 39.95 - 一 0 " 0 0 0 
Vanda Systems 63.42 ~ 63.42 1 1 一 1 _ 1  
Wharf Hdg. 0.04 - 0 — 0 0 0 
Wheelock&Co. 0.78 - ~ Q 0 0 0 
Wing Lung Bk. 43.31~ 43.31 1 1 1 “ 1 
Yugang International 7 9 . 2 5 _ - 0 0 0 0 
Where "Brdshare" stands for the board ownership 
"Famshare" stands for family's shareholding 
"Famrela" stands for family relationship. If a firm where some of the 
directors are relatives, then its "Famrela" equals one, zero otherwise. 
"FamlO" is a family business index. If a firm is a family business under the 
definition stated by "FamlO", then its "FamlO" is one, zero otherwise. 
"Fam20" is a family business index. If a firm is a family business under the 
definition stated by "Fam20", then its "Fam20" is one, zero otherwise. 
"Fam35" is a family business index. If a firm is a family business under the 
definition stated by “Fam35”，then its "Fam35" is one，zero otherwise. 
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Table 3 Six sectors to which the 62 firms belong 
^ iNumber of firms |percentage of the  
iirms in the sector 
Property and construction 14 22.58% 
Conglomerates 14 22.58% 
Bank and Finance 9 14.52% 
Industry 4 6.54% 
Utilities 3 4.84% 
other 19 30.65% 
Total 62 100% 
Table 4 Number of firms with related directors and Number of family 
businesses among the 62 firms 
No. of firms with No. of family No. of family No. of f a m i l y ~ 
related directors businesses under businesses under businesses under 
among the 62 firms definition of "FamlO" definition of "Fam20" definition of "Fam35" 
among the 62 firms among the 62 firms among the 62 firms 
(i^Ov^^hr^li^ ( % of the family ( % of the family ( % of the family 
directors among the businesses under businesses under businesses under 
62 firms) definition of “FamlO’，definition of"Fam20" definition of"Fam35"  
： among the 62 firms) among the 62 firms) among the 62 firms) 
32 30 28 
(51.62%) (48.39%) (45.16%) PSJP/o) 
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Table 5 Number of firms in different ranges of ownership concentration 
among the 62 firms 
Numbers of firms in the Numbers of firms in the Numbers of firms in the 
range of range of range of 
0% - 5% board ownership 5% - 25% board ownership over 25% board ownership 
(% of firms in this range (% of firms in this range (% of firms in this range 
among the 62 firms) among the 62 firms among the 62 firms 
16 5 41 
(25.81%) (8.06%) (66.13%) 
Numbers of firms in the Numbers of firms in the range Numbers of firms in the 
range of of range of 
0% - 35% board ownership 35% - 50% board ownership over 50% board ownership 
(% of firms in this range (% of firms in this range (% of firms in this range 
among the 62 firms) among the 62 firms among the 62 firms 
27 6 29 
(43.55%) (9.68%) (46.77%) 
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Table 6 Number of firms with related directors and number of family 
businesses in each sectors 
Famrela FamlO Fam20 Fam35 
Property & Construction (35 ？；”,。）（35 ？ ； ” , 。 ） ( 2 1 . k 、 
^ 1 11 11 10 9 
Conglomerates (78.570/0) (78.57%) (71.43%) f64.29o/o) 
Bade & Finance (55.56o/o) (2L43o/o) (2L43o/o) (21.43o/o) 
T d t 1 1 1 1 
u s " (25%) (25%) (25%) (25%) 
UtTt. 2 2 2 0 
(66.67%) (66.67%) (66.67%) (66.67%) 
Other S 8 8 8 
(45.11%) (42.11%) (42.110/0) (42.11%) 
Each number in above shows how many firms in a sector have related directors or is 
classified as family businesses under different definition 
The number in the parentheses represents the percentage of the firms which have 
related directors or are classified as family businesses in the sector they belong to. 
For example, there are five firms belonging to the sector of property and construction 
have related directors. That means about 36 percent of the firms in the sector of 
property and construction have related directors. 
Table 7 Number of firms in different ranges of ownership concentration in 
each sector 
Board ownership Board ownership Board ownership 
between between over 25% 
0% - 5% 5% - 25% 
Property & C o n s t r u c t 應 : (71.43o/o) 
^ongbmemtes ( ^； .� ? ^。 ,。） （ 7 / 4 % ) (？？.;。）— 
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Bank & Finance (44.440/,) (22.22o/o) (33.3V/0) 
她 stry (250/0) (25%) (50%) 
TTn.t. 0 1 2 
( 0 ^ (33.33%) (66.67%) 
Oth 2 0 16 
(10.53%) (0%) (84.21%) 
Board ownership Board ownership Board ownership 
between between over 50% 
0% - 35% 35% - 50% 
P r _ y & ConstmctiQn (7 /4%) (42.8^/,) 
Conglomerates (;,。) (14.290/0) (35.7^ o/o) 
Bank & Finance (0%) (33.3V/0) 
她 stry (SQo/o) (0%) (50%) 
TTtTt. 2 0 1 
(66.67%) ( 0 ^ (33.33%) 
Oth 3 3 12 
(15.79%) (15.790/0) (63.160/0) 
Each number in above shows how many firms in that range of board ownership in 
the each sector they belong to. 
The number in the parentheses represents the percentage of the firms which are in 
that range of board ownership in the sector they belong to. 
For example, there are four firms belonging to the sector of property and 
construction are in the range of zero to five percent board ownership. That means 
about 29 percent of the firms in the sector of property and construction are in this 
range. 
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Table 8 Information of the family businesses in the sample 
Name of the Company Shareholding of the family * Who are in the board 
Cheung Kong Holding 33.78% by Li Ka Shing's family A father and a son 
China Star Entertainment 59.47% by Heung Wah Keung's A husband and a wife 
family 
CITIC Pacific 18.52% by Yung Chi Kin's A father and a son 
family 
CLP Holdings Ltd 33.27% by Michael D. Two brothers-in-law 
Kadoorie's family 
Dao Heng Bank Group 71.79% by Quek Leng Chan'sThree brothers 
family 
Esun Holdings Ltd 61.52% by Lim Por Yen's family A father, a mother and 
two sons 
First Pacific 54.32% by Soedono Salim's A father and a son 
family 
Hang Lung Development 35.71% by Ronnie C Chan's Two brothers 
family 
Henderson Investment 70.28% by Lee Shau Kee's Two brothers and t w o ^ 
family sons 
Henderson Land 68.24% by Lee Shau Kee's Three brothers, three 
Development family sons and a son-in-law 
Hinet Holdings Ltd 60.92% by Wong Chue Meng's A father, a son and a  
family daughter-in-law 
Hing KongHoldings 51.66% by Lo Ying Shek's A father, two sons and a 
family daughter 
Hong Kong Construction 11.92% by Yu Ching Po's family A father and a daughter 
Hong Kong Electric 34.63% by Li Tzar Kuoi's family Two brothers 
Hutchison Whamp. 45.64% by Li Ka Shing's family A father, two sons 
Hysan Development 40.25% by Lees' family Five relatives 
ICG Asiaworks Ltd 37.84% by Luk Chung Lam's A father and a son 
family 
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IDT International 62.3% by Raymond Chan's A husband and a wife 
family 
Johnson Electric Holdings 59.64% by Wang Koo Yik's A father and three sons 
family 
Lai Sun Development 56.39% by Lim Por Yen's family A father, a mother and 
two sons 
Li & Fung 58.03% by Fung Kwok Ling'sTwo brothers 
family 
Lippo China Resources 72.6% by Mochtar Riady's A father and two sons 
family 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 69.58% by Liu's family Nine relatives 
Mingly Corporation 65.58% by Cha Chi Ming's A father, a mother, a son 
family and a daughter 
Moulin Intemational 60.56% by M a Bo Kee's family Three brothers, two 
sisters and two sons 
New World Development 38.55% by Cheng Yu Tung's Two brothers and a son 
family 
Sun Hung Kai Properties 46.32% by Kwok Ping Sheung's Three brothers 
family 
Tingyi (Cayman Islands) 68.16% by Wei Ing Chon's Three relatives 
Holdings family 
Vanda Systems 63.42% by Lam Hon Nam's Three relatives by 
family marriage 
Wing Lung Bank 43.31 % by W u Po Ko's family A father and five sons 
* "Shareholding of the family" is the total shareholding of all related directors in a 
firm, except the ones of Hysan Development and New World Development. The 
explanation is provided in Chapter five. 
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Table 9 Data Set of Regression 
Name ROE96 Brdshare |Famrela |FamlO |Fam20 |Fam35 [Founder [Mandir |lmfam 
Group 8.396| 24.79| 0[ Ol Q ^ 
Amoy Properties 5.6^ 58.59 ~ O O P 0 0 0 0 
Asia Tele-Net & Tech. 19.6^ 48.29— 0 "O 0 0 0 0 0 
ASM Pacific Tech. 23.789 50.96 0 0 ~ ~ 0 Q r 0 0 
Bank Of East Asia 17.223 9.52— 1 0 Q Q 0 0 0 
Cathay Pacific 17.972 0 — 〇 0 Q Q 0 0 0 
Century City 8.596 63.63 Q 0 — 0 Q ~ Q 0 0 
Cheung Kong Hdg. 22.8^ 33.84 ~ 1 1 1 0 f f f 
Cheung Kong Mr. 17.376 86.58— 0 〇 • 0 0 0 0 
China Everbright Intl. 0.281 0 0 0 0 0 Q 0 0 
China Internet Global 11.549 40.7 0 0 0 0 I Q 0 
China Pharmaceutical 1 3 . ^ 7.17 0 -Q 0 0 0 0 0 
China Res.Entrep. 9.887 0 — 0 O" 0 O" Q 0 0 
China Star Entertainment -23.897 59.47 1 1 f f Q" Q 7 
Citic Pacific 21.72 27.37— 1 l" 0 Q Q 0 f 
CLP Holdings Ltd 24.405 33.29 T 1 ~ T 0 0 0 0 
Dao Heng Bank Gp. 18.97 71.8— 1 1 — 1 l" 0 f 0 
Denway Motors Ltd. -120.^ 0 ~ 〇 Q Q ~Q Q 0 0 
Dickson Concepts 17.1^ 55.56 ~ 0 0 0 0 T 0 0 
E-Kong Group Ltd. 2.0^ 0.04— 0 Q Q ~Q 0 0 0 
Esun Hdg. Ltd. -0.912 61.52 一 1 l" 1 0 0 r 
First Pacific 75.3 56.52 r 1 r 1 0 0 r 
™ Bank 19.582 1.45" 0 0— 0 Q Q Q 0 
Hang Lung Dev. 10.3M 52.22 ~ 1 f 1 "T 0 0 0 
Hang Seng Bank 18.5^ 0.86— 1 Q Q ~0 Q 0 0 
Henderson Inv. 9.922 70.55 1 — 1 1 f f T 0 
Henderson Ld.Dev. 21?^ 68.4 1 1 1 f f f 0 
Hmet Holdings Ltd. Q.5^ 61— 1 f 1 T 0 T 0 
Hing Kong Holdings -35.2^ 34.22 ~ 1 f 1 T Q f f 
^ China Gas — 16.858 ~ ~ O " 0 〇 Q Q Q Q 
Hong Kong Construction 13.8^ 34.63 ~ 1 f Q "q Q Q f 
Hong Kong Electric 25.315 51.66 一 1 l" 1 〇 Q 0 0 
^ ^ H d g . 20.853 0 Q 0 0 Q ~ Q Q 
Hutchison Whamp. 18.82 46.07 ~ 1 f 1 "q 0 0 T 
Hysan Dev. 4.409 3.26 一 1 1 — 1 l" Q f 0 
ICG Asiaworks Ltd. 7.0^ 38.22— 1 f 1 T 0 0 f 
l Z I I I I I I Z Z I L I Q i 
Intl.Bank Of Asia 19.014 0— 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0 




Johnson Electric Hdg. 9.199 59.87 1 1 \ f 5] I 
Lai Sun Dev. 5.572 56.49 T 1 1 f f f 
Legend Holdings -48.896 26.55— 〇 〇 o" 0 0 0 
Li&Fung 43.345 58.3 T 1 1 f 0 T 0 
Lippo China Res. 8.088 72.6 1 T T T 0 I I 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 13.002 69.62 1 f f f " Q I 0 
Mmgly 7.137 65.58 ~ T I . ] ] ^ f f 
Moulin Intl. 31.427 60.56 " T 1 T T T T 0 
New World Dev. 8.414 0.57— 1 1 1 f 0 T 0 
Oriental Union Hdg. 23.749 71.06— 0 Q Q 0 0 0 0 
Regal Hotels Intl.Hdg. 3.727 71.91 0 Q Q Q Q 0 0 
Sin。Land 4.42f _ _ 0 Q ~ 0 0 0 
Sun Hung Kai Props. 10.825 46.58 T 1 f T 0 T 0 
Swire Pacific 'A' 8.894 0.15— 0 〇 0 Q 0 0 0 
TianAn China Invs. 1.7^ Q.Q7~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TingyiCymn.Isle.Hdg. 25.5 68.16 一 1 1 1 f Q I 0 
Top Glory International 5.4^ 57.38 ~ 0— 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TV-Broadcasts 36.302 39.95 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 
Vanda Systems 32.58 63.42— 1 l" 1 f f f 0 
•WHdg. 2.803 0.04 0 0 ~ 0 ~0 o 0 0 
Wheelock&Co. 6.035 0.78 0 0 ~ ~ 0 j 0 0 0 
Wing Lung Bk. 17.347 8.39 f 1 ~ f T 0 T I 
Yugang International 39.4421 79.25| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
97 1 
Table9 Data Set of Regression (continue) 
Name History Lnass Prop Cong Bank Ind |Ut 
Allied Group 24 "1^46 0 一 1 0 ° ~ Q Q 
Amoy Properties 47 17.4 1 • 〇 0 0 
Asia Tele-Net & Tech. “ 27 13.05 0 一 0 0 0 0 
ASM Pacific Tech. 21 14.21 0 0 0 1 ~~Q 
Bank Of East Asia “ 7 8 1 ^ 0 一 0 1 Q Q 
Cathay Pacific 48 18.02 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 0 
Century City — 15 17.34 〇 1 Q Q "~Q 
Cheung Kong Hdg. “ 25 1 Q 0 0 Q 
Cheung Kong Mr. “ 1 16.25 0 0 Q 〇 0 
China Everbright Intl. 35 14.49 Q 1 0 0 0 
China Internet Global — 24 15.72 Q T 0 Q ~ 0 
China Pharmaceutical 37 13.41 • 0 0 1 0 
China Res.Entrep. 一 0 — 1 〇 ~ 0 0 
China Star Entertainment 9 12.59 0 0 0 〇 0 
Citic Pacific — 11 17.73 0 1 0 0 ~ ~ 0 
CLP Holdings Ltd “ 95 17.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Dao Heng Bank Gp. “ Q 0 1 Q Q 
Denway Motors Ltd. 4 14.08 • 0 0 1 0 
Dickson Concepts % 15 0 0 0 0 0 
E-Kong Group Ltd. 2 12.46~ 〇 O" 0 Q~~~0 
Esun Hdg. Ltd. “ 24 14. iT Q 0 0 0 0 
First Pacific 一 8 ~ 18 0 1 0 〇 0 
•Bank — 3 17.11" 0 〇"“r 0 ~ Q 
Hang Lung Dev. “ 36~17?^ 1 0 0 "~0 0 
Hang Seng Bank “ 4 4 " ! ^ 0 — 0 1 — 0 0 
Henderson Inv. 1 0 0 0 Q 
Henderson Ld.Dev. — 2Q~18.18 1 Q 0 0 0 
Hmet Holdings Ltd. “ 22 0 f 0 ~~0 Q 
Hing Kong Holdings ^ 13.87 T O" Q Q Q 
HK.& China Gas _ 1 3 4 ^ ^ 0 0 Q ~~Q 1 
Hong Kong Construction 23 16.08 ^ 0 〇 Q 0 
Hong Kong Electric 20 17.32 0 0 0 〇 " T 
H S C B Hdg. 31 21.86" 0 Q" 1 0 ~ ~ 0 
Hutchison Whamp. — 19~ 18.7 0 1 0 0 0 
Hysan Dev. _ 2 6 ~ 1 7 ^ 1 0 0 "~0 0 
ICG Asiaworks Ltd. 19 — 14.61 0 Q O" 0 0 
IDT Intl. “ 19 13.41 0 0 0 0 0 
Intl.BankOf Asia — 26 16.93 0 0 1 0 0 
JCG Holdings 19! 15.27| Q| Q| l| o| 0 
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Johnson Electric Hdg. 35 15.37I ^ qI Ol ^ Q 
Lai Sun Dev. 37 16.91' 1 0 0 〇 ~ ~ Q 
Legend Holdings 8 14.18 0 0 0 0 0 
Li & Fung — 59 14.88 〇 0 0 0 ~ ~ Q 
Lippo China Res. 23 1 0 Q "q Q 
Liu Chong Hmg Bank ^ 17.12— 0 Q 1 0 0 
Mmgly —— 8 16.31 Q 1— 0 Q Q 
Moulin Intl. 一 31 13.39 Q 〇— 0 1 ~~~Q 
New World Dev. ^ 18.38— 1 Q 〇 0 0 
Oriental Union Hdg. 14 13.1 Q 0 〇 0 0 
Regal Hotels Intl.Hdg. 16 16.81 _ 0 0 0 〇 0 
Sino Land . 25""“114 1 0 0 "O Q 
Sun Hung Kai Props. 一 24 18.75 1 0 Q 0 0 
Swire Pacific 'A' — 56 18.65 0 1 Q Q ~~0 
Tian An ChinaInvs. “ 1 0 0 Q Q 
TingyiCymn.Isle.Hdg. “ 0 — 〇 〇 Q Q 
Top Glory International 23 15.64 0 I 0 0 0 
TV-Broadcasts “ 31 14.72 Q 0 0 0 0 
Vanda Systems 0— 0 0 0 0 
Wharf Hdg. — IQ 18.57 Q 1 0 0 ~ Q 
Wheelock&Co. — 78 17.66 0 1 0 0 ~ ~ Q 
Wing Lung Bk. — 63 17.66 Q 0 1 0 ~ 0 
Yugang International H 14.14 〇 Q 0 0 0 
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Table 10 Average ROE comparison between different groups of firms 
Table 10.1 
Average ROE (No. of firms) 
Famrela = 0 7.294% (30) 
Famrela = 1 14.90% (32) 
Table 10.2 
Average ROE (No. of firms) 
Brdshare 0%-5% 1.51% (16) 
Brdshare 5%-25% 14.64% (5) 
Brdshare over 25% 14.59% (41) 
Brdshare 0%-35% 3.56% (27) 
Brdshare 35%-50% 17.36% (6) 
Brdshare over50% 17.08% (29) 
Table 10.3 
Average ROE (No. of firms) 
FamlO = 1 14.69% (30) 
FamlO = 0 7.96% (32) 
Fam20 = 1 14.47% (28) 
Fam20 = 0 8.54% (34) 
Fam35 = 1 13.08% (24) 
Fam35 = 0 10.04% (38) 
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Table 10.4 
Average ROE (No. of firms) 
Founder = 1 21.05% (12) 
Founder 二 0 8.86% (50) 
Table 10.5 
Average ROE (No. of firms) 
Property and Construction 1 0 . 1 2 % ^ 
Conglomerates 1 3 . 2 4 % ^ 
Bank and Finance 18.73% (9) 
Industry -13.09% (4) 
Utilities 22.19% (3) 
Other 13.03% (19) 
Table 10.6 
Average ROE (No. of firms)  
Lnass 12-14 8.48% (9) 
Lnass 14-16 4.65% (18) 
Lnass 16-18 12.38% (22) 
Lnass over 18 20.25% (13) 
Table 10.7 
Average ROE (No. of firms)  
History 1-10 -1.93 (12) 
History 11-30 14.72 (29) 
’ History 31-50 14.85 (13) 
History over 50 12.36 (8) 
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Table 11 Results of the regression models 
Table 11.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -48.4976 30.3299 -1.5990[.116] 
FAMIO 7.2372 6.1303 1.1806[.243] 
FOUNDER 20.4514 7.6209 2.6836[.010] 
HISTORY .060897 .14266 .42688[.671] 
LNASS 3.6175 2.0271 1.7846[.080] 
PROP -19.8036 9.7802 -2.0249[.048] 
CONG -4.8655 9.2574 -.52559[.601] 
BANK -5.0170 11.7130 -.42833[.670] 
IND -27.8627 12.6263 -2.2067[.032] 
UT -1.1862 17.3275 -.068456[.946] 
R-Squared : 0.26328 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.13577 
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Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable : R0E96 
Number of observations: 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rat io[Prob] 
C -47.3637 30.4854 -1.5537[.126] 
FAM20 5.3221 6.1328 .86781[.389] 
FOUNDER 20.3825 7.6922 2.6498[.011] 
HISTORY .051064 .14301 .35707[.722] 
LNASS 3.6130 2.0394 1.7716[.082] 
PROP -18.6594 9.7323 -1.9173[.061] 
CONG -4.5983 9.3430 -.49216[.625] 
BANK -5.0754 11.7874 -.43058[.669] 
IND -28.1923 12.7112 -2.2179[.031] 
UT -.14941 17.3882 -.0085926[.993] 
R-Squared : 0.25433 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.12527 
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Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -49.8335 30.8687 -1.6144[.112] 
FAM35 5.3839 6.3147 .85259[.398] 
FOUNDER 20.7954 7.6572 2.7158[.009] 
HISTORY .037556 .14289 .26283[.794] 
LNASS 3.7939 2.0489 1.8517[.070] 
PROP -18.6394 9.7356 -1.9146[.061] 
CONG -4.4904 9.3591 -.47979[.633] 
BANK -5.4671 11.7791 -.46413[.644] 
IND -28.1229 12.7263 -2.2098[.032] 
UT 3.8880 17.4655 .22261[.825] 
R-Squared : 0.25396 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.12484 
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Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rat io[Prob] 
C -46.0776 30.5279 -1.5094[.137] 
MANDIR 4.2507 6.9627 .61050[.544] 
FOUNDER 20.3254 7.7809 2.6122[.012] 
LNASS 3.6456 2.0469 1.7811[.081] 
HISTORY .035145 .14381 .24440[.808] 
PROP -18.9356 10.0229 -1.8892[.064] 
CONG -5.1030 9.3461 -.54601[.587] 
BANK -6.0255 11.8469 -.50862[.613] 
IND -29.2612 12.6832 -2.3071[.025] 





Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable is ROE96 
Number of observations: 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rat io[Prob] 
C -48.7146 30.6122 -1.5913[.118] 
FAMIO 8.9054 8.5932 1.0363[.305] 
MANDIR -2.7032 9.6662 -.27965[.781] 
FOUNDER 20.7983 7.7887 2.6703[.010] 
LNASS 3.6046 2.0458 1.7619[.084] 
HISTORY .070026 .14759 •47446[.637] 
PROP -19.3136 10.0224 -1.9270[.060] 
CONG -4.9021 9.3415 -.52477[.602] 
BANK -4.5820 11.9202 -.38439[.702] 
IND -27.5943 12.7758 -2.1599[.036] 




Table 11.6 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "Fam20" and 
"Mandir’， 
Dependent variable is ROE96 
Number of observations: 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -47.4017 30.7899 -1.5395[.130] 
FAM20 5.6996 9.3279 .61103[.544] 
MANDIR -.57113 10.5520 -.054126[.957] 
FOUNDER 20.4363 7.8303 2.6099[.012] 
LNASS 3.6096 2.0602 1.7521[.086] 
HISTORY .052693 .14750 .35723[.722] 
PROP -18.5318 10.1055 -1.8338[.073] 
CONG -4.5768 9.4423 -.48471[.630] 
BANK -4.9764 12.0420 -.41325[.681] 
IND -28.1249 12.8951 -2.1811[.034] 




Tablell.7 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "Fam35” and "mandir" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -49.9982 31.4351 -1.5905[.118] 
FAM35 5.6760 9.6417 .58869[.559] 
MANDIR -.42798 10.5953 -.040393[.968] 
FOUNDER 20.8573 7.8822 2.6461[.Oil] 
LNASS 3.8013 2.0768 1.8304[.073] 
HISTORY .038052 .14480 .26279[.794] 
PROP -18.5443 10.1084 -1.8345[.072] 
CONG -4.4676 9.4671 -.47191[.639] 
BANK -5.4136 11.9673 -.45236[.653] 
IND -28.0673 12.9237 -2.1718[.035] 




Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with " F a m l O " and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable: ROE96 
Number of observations: 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -46.4088 30.2900 -1.5321[.132] 
FAMRELA 6.5232 6.0595 1.0765[.287] 
FOUNDER 20.5720 7.6336 2.6949[.009] 
HISTORY .046083 .14219 .32409[.747] 
LNASS 3.5146 2.0343 1.7276[.090] 
PROP -19.1677 9.7233 -1.9713[.054] 
CONG -4.5876 9.2950 -.49355[.624] 
BANK -5.9460 11.7374 -.50659[.615] 
IND -28.0710 12.6471 -2.2196[.031] 
UT .19488 17.2508 .011297[.991] 
R-Squared : 0.26002 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.13195 
109 
Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -45.2771 30.9636 -1.4623[.150] 
IMFAM .059564 6.9709 .0085447[.993] 
FOUNDER 21.1097 7.7017 2.7409[.008] 
LNASS 3.6313 2.0631 1.7601[.084] 
HISTORY .042998 .14376 .29909[.766] 
PROP -17.2421 9.7146 -1.7749[.082] 
CONG -5.3324 9.3849 -.56819[.572] 
BANK -5.5217 11.8722 -.46509[.644] 
IND -29.3767 12.8953 -2.2781[.027] 




Table 11.5 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" and "Mandir" 
Dependent variable: ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -59.5551 30.8135 -1.9328[.059] 
BRDSHARE .21260 .12039 1.7659[.083] 
FOUNDER 16.1827 7.9839 2.0269[.048] 
HISTORY .10245 .14361 .71336[.479] 
LNASS 3.8337 1.9984 1.9184[.061] 
PROP -14.8546 9.4807 -1.5668[.123] 
CONG -2.3851 9.2546 -.25773[.798] 
BANK -1.5846 11.7348 -.13503[.893] 
IND -23.1133 12.8630 -1.7969[.078] 
UT .57439 16.9001 .033987[.973] 
R-Squared : 0.28633 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.16281 
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Table 11.11 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "Famrela" and 
"Brdshare" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -58.5459 31.1633 -1.8787[.066] 
FAMRELA 2.6689 6.5753 .40589[.687] 
BRDSHARE .19049 .13303 1.4320[.158] 
FOUNDER 16.4751 8.0810 2.0387[.047] 
HISTORY .097522 .14529 .67124[.505] 
LNASS 3.7654 2.0217 1.8625[.068] 
PROP -15.8933 9.8944 -1.6063[.114] 
CONG -2.3881 9.3298 -.25597[.799] 
BANK -2.1662 11.9166 -.18178[.856] 
IND -23.2248 12.9705 -1.7906[.079] 
UT .089711 17.0793 .0052526[.996] 
R-Squared : 0.28862 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.14914 
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Tablell . l2 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "Imfam" and 
"Brdahsre" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -58.5444 31.2394 -1.8741[.067] 
IMFAM -2.2454 6.9516 32301[.748] 
BRDSHARE .22003 .12361 1.7801[.081] 
FOUNDER 16.0001 8.0734 1.9818[.053] 
LNASS 3.7786 2.0231 1.8678[.068] 
HISTORY .10539 .14515 .72604[.471] 
PROP -14.4455 9.6469 -1.4974[.140] 
CONG -2.1252 9.3699 -.22681[.821] 
BANK -1.6132 11.8375 -.13628[.892] 
IND -23.5632 13.0498 -1.8056[.077] 




Table 11.13 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "BrdOtoS", "Brd5to25" 
and "Brdover25" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -60.4653 31.4303 -1.9238[.060] 
BRD0T05 5.4697 3.5467 1.5422[.129] 
BRD5T025 -1.0640 .93039 -1.1436[.258] 
BRDOVER25 .26661 .24696 1.0796[.286] 
FOUNDER 17.5331 8.0227 2.1855[.034] 
HISTORY .020993 .15516 .13530[.893] 
LNASS 3.8299 2.0203 1.8957[.064] 
PROP -15.0026 9.5429 -1.5721[.122] 
CONG -1.0995 9.3854 -.11715[.907] 
BANK -5.4854 11.9910 -.45746[.649] 
IND -28.0185 13.2415 -2.1160[.039] 
UT 1.9827 17.1754 .11544[.909] 
R-Squared : 0.31713 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.16690 
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Table 11.14 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with “Brd0to35，，， 
"Brd35to50" and "BrdoverSO" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -59.4132 31.7533 -1.8711[.067] 
BRD0T035 .10216 .32623 .31316[.755] 
BRD35T050 .86783 .79618 1.0900[.281] 
BRDOVER50 -.19148 .47817 -.40044[.691] 
FOUNDER 15.5275 8.1125 1.9140[.061] 
HISTORY .10610 .14683 .72263[.473] 
LNASS 3.8628 2.0445 1.8894[.065] 
PROP -15.1182 9.7084 -1.5572[.126] 
CONG -3.4484 9.4968 -.36311[.718] 
BANK -1.9637 11.8693 -.16544[.869] 
IND -25.0341 13.1695 -1.9009[.063] 
UT -.41692 17.3676 -.024006[.981] 
R-Squared : 0.29916 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.14497 
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Table 11.15 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "BrdOtoS", "Brd5to25", 
"Brdover25" and "Famrela" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rat io[Prob] 
C -59.4380 32.0217 -1.8562[.069] 
FAMRELA 1.6271 6.8196 .23859[.812] 
BRD0TO5 5.3186 3.6362 1.4627[.150] 
BRD5T025 -1.0739 .94021 -1.1422[.259] 
BRD0VER25 .26490 .24943 1.0620[.293] 
FOUNDER 17.7058 8.1317 2.1774[.034] 
HISTORY .021088 .15664 .13463[.893] 
LNASS 3.7685 2.0558 1.8331[.073] 
PROP -15.5563 9.9097 -1.5698[.123] 
CONG -1.0387 9.4786 -.10959[.913] 
BANK -5.7577 12.1594 -.47352[.638] 
IND -27.9990 13.3684 -2.0944[.041] 
UT 1.8492 17.3487 .10659[.916] 
R-Squared : 0.31793 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.15089 
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Table 11.16 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with “Brd0to35,，， 
"Br(135to50", "BrdoverSO" and "Famrela" 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 62 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -58.0013 32.3139 -1.7949[.079] 
FAMRELA 2.3128 6.8908 .33564[.739] 
BRD0TO35 .061898 .35034 .17668[.860] 
BRD35T050 .86287 .80348 1.0739[.288] 
BRDOVER50 -.18211 .48328 -.37683[.708] 
FOUNDER 15.8434 8.2394 1.9229[.060] 
HISTORY .10364 .14833 .69870[.488] 
LNASS 3.7751 2.0794 1.8155[.076] 
PROP -15.8758 10.0525 -1.5793[.121] 
CONG -3.3129 9.5907 -.34542[.731] 
BANK -2.4817 12.0750 -.20552[.838] 
IND -25.1300 13.2910 -1.8908[.065] 
UT -.54757 17.5281 -.031240[.975] 
R-Squared : 0.30076 
R-Bar-Squared : 0.12952 
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Table 11.17 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation with "FamlO" by using 60 
observations 
Dependent variable : ROE96 
Number of observations : 60 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
C -50.8576 31.0946 -1.6356[.108] 
FAMIO 7.3797 6.4308 1.1476[.257] 
FOUNDER 20.6760 7.7665 2.6622[.010] 
HISTORY .054673 .14642 .37339[.710] 
LNASS 3.7810 2.0880 1.8108[.076] 
PROP -20.8554 10.1804 -2.0486[.046] 
CONG -4.2490 9.4511 -.44958[.655] 
BANK -5.4665 11.9425 -.45774[.649] 
IND -27.7583 12.8217 -2.1649[.035] 




Tablel2 Correlation among independent variables 
Table 12.1 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"FamlO" 
FamlO Founder History Lnass 
•FamlO — 1 -0.07313 0.106145 _-0.00507  
Founder ~.Q7313 T 0.070661 ~ 0.127136 
History —57106145 0.0706^ 1 一 -0.0359 
Lnass -0.00507| 0.1271361 -0.03591 1 
Table 12.2 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Fam20" 
Fam20 Founder Lnass History 
Fam2Q ~ 1 -0.10889 -0.00942 0.064806 
Founder —-0.10889 " ~ T 0.127407 0.071389 
Lnass —0.00942 0.127而 1 -0.03609 
History 0.0648061 0.0713891 -Q.036Q9| 1 
Table 12.3 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Fam35" 
Fam35 Founder Lnass History 
Fam35 ~ 1 -0.0481 0.094055 -0.04486 
Founder -0.0481 ~ T 0.121876 0.081068  
Lnass 0.094055 0.121^ l" -0.03958 
History -Q.04486[ 0.081068| -0.03958| 1 
119 
Table 12.4 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Mandir" 
Mandir Founder Lnass History 
Mandir — 1 -0.16^ 0.012771 -0.0897 
Founder “ -0.16504 — 1 0.123247 0.09249 
Lnass "0.012771 0.123涵 1 -Q.Q3656 
History -0.0897! 0.09249丨-0.03656. 1 
Table 12.5 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
“Mandir" and "FamlO" 
FamlO Mandir Founder Lnass History 
^ 1 0 r -0.69418 ~058591 -0.01936 0.228045 
i^ndir -0.69418 1 "-0.15927 0.022628 -0.22117 
Sunder 0.0585^ -0.15927 ~ 1 0.121876 0.103256 
Lnass -O.Ql"^ 0.022628 0.121876 1 -0^ 04 
History 0.2280451 -0.22117! 0.1〇3256丨 -0.04丨 j" 
Table 12.6 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Mandir" and "Fam20’’ 
Fam20 Mandir Founder Lnass History 
Fam20 一 1 -0.74786 0.02318^-0.02856 0 . 1 9 ^ 
Mandir -0.747^ 1 -0.12687 "0029834 -0.204QT 
冗under 0.02318" -0.12687 1 "0122497 0.095204 
Lnass -0.028^ 0.029834 0.122497 1 -0.0414 
History Q.194688| -0.20401 [ 0.0952041 -0.0414| 1 
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Table 12.7 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Mandir" and "Fam35" 
Fam35 Mandir Founder Lnass History 
^ 3 5 T -0.75011 ~114628 0.127317 0.034098 
Mandir -0.75QTT 1 —-0.19441 -0.08722 -0.08486 
Founder 0.1146^ -0.19441 _ 1 0.136034 0.Q95736 
Lnass 0.127317 -0.08722 " o . 136034 1 -Q.0319 
mstory 0.034098! -Q.08486| O.Q95736| -0.0319! 
Table 12.8 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Famrela" and "Brdshare" 
Famrela Brdshare Founder Lnass History 
^ e l a T -0.40935" 0.089126 ~Q.Q8323 -0.083^ 
B^hare -0.409$ l" -0.35404~0086641 0.247241 
Founder ~a089126 -0.35404 1 0.090536 -0.01722 
L ^ s -0.083$ 0.086641 “ Q.Q9Q536 1 -0.013% 
ffi^ry -0.083521 0.2472411 -0.01722| -0.〇1386| 1 
Table 12.9 Correlation among independent variables in regression with 
"Imfam" and "Brdshare" 
Imfam Brdshare Founder Lnass History 
M A M 1 -0.18627 0.070021 0.084269 ~ A Q 6 2 6 6 
^ h a r e -0.18627 1 “ -0.35553 0.040911 0.241447 
^nder 0.070021 -0.35553 1 0.103999 -0.0142 
L I ^ S 0.084269 0.040911 " Q. 103999 1 -Q.Q2613 
History -0.06266| 0.241447[ -0.01421 -0.026131 1 
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